Electoral Promises in the Philippines

How to cite

Labonne, Julien; Cruz, Cesi; Keefer, Philip; Trebbi, Francesco. 2016. "Electoral Promises in the Philippines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001210. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1210-1.0

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Julien Labonne* , Cesi Cruz , Philip Keefer , Francesco Trebbi

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001210
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1210-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2016-03-02 – 2016-12-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1210

Abstract

This project focuses on electoral promises and their impacts in municipal elections of the Philippines. The core of the project - conducted in collaboration with the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting - relies on conducting an informational treatment in the context of the 2016 mayoral elections in the Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte regions of the country. We followed a similar approach in trial AEARCTR-0000688 which studied the 2013 elections, research upon which this project builds. Voters in randomly selected villages will receive information on the promises of candidates running in the 2016 elections and a random subset of them will also be reminded of the promises made by candidates ahead of the 2013 elections.

The project seeks to answer questions such as:
1. What are the effects of repeated promises on voter and candidate behavior, including vote buying?
2. How does incumbent compliance with past promises influence voter reactions to new promises?
3. How do promises and their effects vary with the strength of incumbents?

We will also estimate key parameters of a structural model of vote choice based on elicitation of voters beliefs and heterogenous preferences for policy. In addition, we will be able to run some counterfactual simulations, including, but not limited to:
1. What would have happened to the elections without electoral promises?
2. What would have happened to the elections without vote buying?
3. What would have been the effects of the intervention if candidates were unable to buy votes?

Experimental design

The electoral treatments include willingly disclosed campaign promises on the part of incumbent and challengers in each race. The set of campaign promises includes the 2016 policy promises and the policy promises made at the previous electoral round in 2013. An example of the 2013 flyer is attached. The 2016 flyers will follow a similar design.

The sample will be divided into three groups:
(a). Treatment 1: Receive two flyers (i) the promises made by candidates running in the 2016 mayoral elections and, (ii) the promises made by the candidates in 2013
(b). Treatment 2: Receive a flyer with the promises made by candidates running in the 2016 mayoral elections.
(c). Control: do not receive any flyer.

The flyers will be distributed through door-to-door visits a few days before the elections.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization was done using a Stata code.
Randomization unit
Randomisation was done at the village-level.
Clusters
The sample will include 158 villages in 7 of the 12 municipalities where the experiment was carried out in 2013. In the other 5 municipalities the incumbent is running unopposed in 2016.
Observations
We expect to interview 22 households per village for a total sample size of 3,476 households.
Arms
The villages will be allocated as follows: 54 Treatment 1 villages, 50 Treatment 2 villages and 54 control villages.
Primary outcomes
Key outcome variables are: Beliefs about candidate promises, salience of local development spending on voting decisions, vote share and vote buying. In addition, as a long-term outcome of trial AEARCTR-0000688 we will also collect data on public goods provision at the village level between 2013 and 2016. The survey instruments will also include a module necessary to estimate the structural model. It is designed to elicit voters' beliefs about proposed spending by the top 3 candidates.

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Keywords