Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi
How to cite
Jack, B. Kelsey. 2016. "Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001207. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1207-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Efficient targeting of public programs is difficult when the cost or benefit to potential recipients is private information. This study illustrates the potential of self-selection to improve allocational outcomes in the context of a program that subsidizes tree planting in Malawi. Landholders who received a tree planting contract as a result of bidding in an auction kept significantly more trees alive over a three year period than did landholders who received the contract through a lottery. The gains from targeting on private information through the auction represent a 30 percent cost savings per surviving tree for the implementing organization.
Intervention
The study sought to determine whether self-selection into a tree-planting program could increase the number of surviving trees. The program required participating farmers to plant 50 seedlings on half an acre of their own land. ICRAF distributed the seedlings, trained farmers, and monitored tree survival at regular intervals—six months, one year, two years, and three years after the start of the program. Farmers were compensated based on the number of trees that were still alive at each inspection.
There were two different selection methods: auction and lottery. In the auction group, participants submitted bids for the minimum compensation for which they would participate in the program. Sealed bids were collected and ranked on the spot to determine the auction clearing price based on the available budget and the first rejected bid. Participants in the lottery group were told the take-it or leave-it price, based on the auction clearing price (but were not informed about the source of the price).The lottery was conducted among those participants who were willing to accept this price.
Experimental design
The study sample was collected from a census of 472 households in 23 villages conducted by ICRAF. Households reporting less than one acre of private land in the baseline survey were ineligible for contracting and were excluded from the randomization. Treatment groups were assigned using a simple random draw. All households were invited to the allocation process and upon arrival were separated into their preassigned treatment groups. The contract details were explained in identical fashion to both groups after which the auction group was explained the details of the auction and lottery group the details of the lotter process. 85 households selected into the auction arm and 91 households were selected into the lottery arm.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Jack, B Kelsey. 2013. "Private Information and the Allocation of Land Use Subsidies in Malawi." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(3): 113-35. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/658%20Private%20info%20and%20allocation%20of%20land%20AEJ%202013.pdf
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