Eliciting Trust and Reciprocity in a Multi-ethnic Context
How to cite
Mantilla, César; Yang, Donghui; Zhou, Ling; Suping, Shen; Wang, Charlotte; Seabright, Paul. 2016. "Eliciting Trust and Reciprocity in a Multi-ethnic Context." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001206. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1206-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to use economic experiments to measure trust, trustworthiness and reciprocity in a setting with a particular ethnic and religious composition, the Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, in the Yunnan Province in Southwest China. The Dai ethnic group, a minority at the Chinese-wide level, is majoritarian in Xishuangbanna with 29.9% of the population. The country’s majoritarian ethnic group, the Han-Chinese, occupies the second place within Xishuangbanna with 29.1% of the population. Besides, there are another seven ethnic groups with at least 1% of Xishuangbanna’s total population. This large ethinic diversity is accompanied by variation in religious affiliations between and within ethnic groups, including Buddhists, Protestants, Muslims and Christians.
We aim to use this ethnic and religious diversity to explore how preferences and behavior differ in economic interactions according to the primed characteristics from the subjects with which they will interact with. Economic experiments have been shown to be helpful in the elicitation of preferences when is monetarily costly to declare what might be socially expected but does not reveal the participants’ tastes (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Habyarimana et al. 2007). Our experiment comprises two well-known economic games, a trust game (Block 1 - 5 rounds) and a public goods game with punishment (Block 2 - 5 rounds). In the trust game there will be a quasi-random rematching after every round, aiming to allow each subject to interact at least two times with subjects from their own ethnic group and another two times with subjects from a different ethnic group. Either the ethnic affiliation or the religious confession from the other group member will be revealed in each round of the game. In the public goods game with punishment subjects will be assigned to groups of four participants. Within each session we will have homogeneous and heterogeneous groups in terms of declared ethnicity. After the allocation stage, the contribution of each group member will be publicly revealed (with game IDs, not their actual identity), and subjects will have a chance to incur in a costly punishment.
Intervention
We will perform a lab-in-the-field experiment in groups of twenty participants using tablets. Participants in each session will come from two different groups, usually defined by different ethnic affiliations.
Experimental design
We will set up a lab-in-the-field experiment. We aim to run sessions of 20 participants each, although it may be possible to run session with at least twelve participants depending on the circumstances. In the trust game the participant's role, sender or receiver, is fixed throughout all the block of five rounds. A random reshuffling procedure is applied between rounds. In rounds 2 and 4 participants are informed about their partner’s ethnicity. In rounds 3 and 5 participants are informed about their partner’s religious affiliation. One round from Block 1 is randomly selected to be paid.
In the public goods game with punishment groups of four participants are fixed at the beginning of the block. Within session, 40% of the groups have a homogeneous composition in terms of ethnicity. The remaining 60% are mixed in terms of ethnicity. Group composition (ethnicity) is announced at the contribution stage. During the punishment stage is revealed, with an experimental ID, the contribution and the ethnicity of each group member. All five rounds of Block 2 are paid at the end.
At the end of the two games we will make a short survey.
Design details
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