The Design of Recurrent Procurement Auctions

How to cite

Vega, Carlos; Ennis, Sean; Salmon, Timothy; Bokhari, Farasat. 2023. "The Design of Recurrent Procurement Auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012049. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12049-2.0

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Carlos Vega* , Sean Ennis , Timothy Salmon , Farasat Bokhari

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012049
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12049-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-10-18 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C73, C91, D44, H57, L11
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12049

Abstract

We look at the behavior of laboratory auction markets when a dynamic reserve price is imposed. When firms exit markets due to high costs, competition wavers and bidders bid less aggressively. Ensuing higher prices could conceivably be modulated by a reserve price mechanism that uses the lowest bid from the previous period. Using a controlled setting, we show how dynamics in reserve price setting influence bid shading and if the behavior of these markets are more consistent with standard predictions or with the focal point hypothesis.

Intervention

Our intervention in procurement auction markets involves settting a dynamic reserve price based on outcomes from a previous round. Specifically, we will use the winning bid in the previous period to set the maximum bid possible for bidders in the next round. Two variants will be investigated. The first involves a single auction market, and the second uses a multi market setting. In the first variant, a market's bid cap is determined by the winning bid in that market from the previous round, while the second variant uses another market's winning bid in the previous round.

Experimental design

The experiment requires four treatments using the low price sealed bid mechanism: one without a dynamic reserve price, one using a dynamic reserve price in a single market, the third using a dynamic reserve price with multiple markets, and the fourth without a bid cap splitting the award between the two lowest bidders.
Using a between-subjects design, each participant is exposed to only one of the three conditions and plays multi-round auctions.
In round 1 of each sequence, everyone is told their realized cost and everyone participates. In each subsequent round, participants are told their realized cost for that round and will be allowed to choose whether or not to participate in the auction for that round. If they choose not to participate in a round, they will not be able to participate for the remaining rounds in that sequence, but they will be able to rejoin in the subsequent sequence. After deciding to participate, the participants are informed of the number of competitors who are participating. Each competitor will have received a realized cost using the same method with all draws being independent.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization by a computer
Randomization unit
group of students
Clusters
96 groups
Observations
14,400 bids
Arms
120 students each treatment
Primary outcomes
bidding behaviour (bids), auction price, entry (number of sellers), efficiency

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords