The effect of cartel-fine structure on cartel pricing and cartel stability
How to cite
Engilbertsson, Sindri; Treuren, Leonard; Onderstal, Sander. 2023. "The effect of cartel-fine structure on cartel pricing and cartel stability." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012043. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12043-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This paper considers the policy question of how cartels should be fined, building on a recent theoretical literature. We compare three different designs for cartel fines on the formation and pricing behavior of cartels theoretically and using a laboratory experiment. The three fining regimes are based on i) profits, ii) revenue, and iii) overcharge. The theoretical findings suggest that the revenue-regime will result in prices above the monopoly level, while the overcharge-regime will keep cartel prices below the monopoly level. Additionally, we expect deterrence to be the greatest under the overcharge regime, and equal under the profit and revenue regimes. We design an experiment that provides a test of our predictions.
Experimental design
Our experiment tests the pricing and cartel deterrence effects of three different cartel fining regimes: fines based on cartel profits, cartel revenues, and cartel overcharge. Subjects play an infinitely repeated Bertrand triopoly game. In each period, subjects first engage in optional communication and then set their price unilaterally. Next, the market clears, and communication is detected and punished with a fixed probability of 0.2. We vary fines across different treatments by basing them either on a firm’s revenue, profit, or overcharge. Finally, subjects receive feedback on the prices, fines, and profits. With probability 0.9, the three matched subjects play another period, while with probability 0.1, each subject is re-matched with two new subjects before playing the next period.
Design details
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