The effect of cartel-fine structure on cartel pricing and cartel stability

How to cite

Engilbertsson, Sindri; Treuren, Leonard; Onderstal, Sander. 2023. "The effect of cartel-fine structure on cartel pricing and cartel stability." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012043. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12043-2.0

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Sindri Engilbertsson* , Leonard Treuren , Sander Onderstal

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0012043
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12043-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-09-11 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Netherlands (Amterdam)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/12043

Abstract

This paper considers the policy question of how cartels should be fined, building on a recent theoretical literature. We compare three different designs for cartel fines on the formation and pricing behavior of cartels theoretically and using a laboratory experiment. The three fining regimes are based on i) profits, ii) revenue, and iii) overcharge. The theoretical findings suggest that the revenue-regime will result in prices above the monopoly level, while the overcharge-regime will keep cartel prices below the monopoly level. Additionally, we expect deterrence to be the greatest under the overcharge regime, and equal under the profit and revenue regimes. We design an experiment that provides a test of our predictions.

Experimental design

Our experiment tests the pricing and cartel deterrence effects of three different cartel fining regimes: fines based on cartel profits, cartel revenues, and cartel overcharge. Subjects play an infinitely repeated Bertrand triopoly game. In each period, subjects first engage in optional communication and then set their price unilaterally. Next, the market clears, and communication is detected and punished with a fixed probability of 0.2. We vary fines across different treatments by basing them either on a firm’s revenue, profit, or overcharge. Finally, subjects receive feedback on the prices, fines, and profits. With probability 0.9, the three matched subjects play another period, while with probability 0.1, each subject is re-matched with two new subjects before playing the next period.

Design details

Randomization method
Participants register for sessions without information on the treatment. Within the lab, the computers are set up such that two participants in the same matching group will never sit next to one another. Participants are then randomly placed at computers to randomize matching groups within sessions.
Randomization unit
Experimental sessions.
Clusters
30 matching groups. Each experimental session has 18 participants that are split into matching groups of 9. During the experiment, participants are grouped into new 'markets' of three for each of the four supergames. To make sure no participants are ever in the same group twice, we rematch within matching groups of 9.
Observations
1080 groups of 3 participants. In total we will have 270 participants and each participant is a member of four different groups (or 'markets') during a session.
Arms
360 groups in profit regime, 360 groups in revenue regime, and 360 groups in overcharge regime.
Primary outcomes
Market prices and prices set by firms, also broken down by cartel status. Cartel (re-)formation, cartel agreements, and stability of collusive agreements.

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Keywords