Perceptions of Corruption and Tax Compliance: A Survey Experiment in Honduras
How to cite
Cruces, Guillermo; Ardanaz, Martín; Ajzenman, Nicolás; Lunghi, Ignacio. 2023. "Perceptions of Corruption and Tax Compliance: A Survey Experiment in Honduras." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012039. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12039-1.3
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Can strategic communication significantly enhance the image of the tax authority and boost tax morale among taxpayers? We conduct an extensive online survey experiment following a significant institutional overhaul of the Honduran tax authority, which involved a substantial personnel renewal. The project seeks to provide empirical insights to determine which are the most effective methods for communicating and reap out the benefits of institutional changes. Our research aims to evaluate the efficacy of three distinct messaging interventions on perceptions of the tax authority and on indicators of taxpayers' willingness to comply with tax obligations. The informational treatments encompass a message highlighting Honduran citizen’s perception of their tax authority as relatively honest in a regional comparison– the "perception" treatment. The message in a second treatment arm emphasizes the extensive staff renewal within the Honduran Revenue Administration Service (SAR, as per its Spanish acronym) as a measure to combat corruption – the "purge" treatment. Finally, a third treatment arm integrates the "perception" treatment followed by the "purge" message – the "combined" treatment. A control group received a placebo message, providing neutral information about the tax authority. We investigate the divergent impacts of these treatments on two distinct sets of outcomes: firstly, on perceptions of the tax authority, and secondly, on tax morale and indicators of willingness to comply with or evade tax obligations.
Intervention
In this project, we will employ various messaging interventions to assess their relative impact on taxpayer perceptions and willingness to pay or evade taxes within the context of the Honduran tax administration (SAR, as per its Spanish acronym). There are four treatment arms:
• The control group, which received basic information about SAR's role in tax collection, together with an image of the locations of the SAR offices in Honduras.
• The "perception" treatment arm, which provides basic information about SAR's role in tax collection and information about SAR's reputation as one of the less corrupt tax authorities in Latin America, backed by a graph using survey data indicating it as the second most honest tax authority institution in the Latin American region.
• The "purge" treatment, which transmits SAR's recognition of corruption as a significant issue and its recent efforts to combat it. The message highlights the personnel renewal done by the institution for the purpose of reducing corruption and includes a simple figure to illustrate the magnitude of the reform.
• The "combined" treatment arm, which combines the two previous information treatments with the "perception" message followed by the "purge" treatment.
Experimental design
The primary goal is to identify how the different information treatments impact subject’s perceptions of corruption of the tax administration in Honduras, the potentially subsequent willingness to evade taxes and related outcomes. Data will be collected through an online survey. Participants will be selected randomly from the general population of Honduras (with internet access) and will be assigned to different communication treatments (explained in the Intervention section):
1. Control.
2. "Perception" Treatment.
3. "Purge" Treatment.
4. "Purge" + "perception" treatment ("combined" treatment).
The primary outcomes include a set of self-reported outcomes regarding the beliefs and perceptions of the tax authority (presented in the Primary Outcomes Section). The secondary outcomes are related to self-reported measures of willingness to evade taxes, and other outcomes regarding tax morale and honest behavior in a dice game (presented in the Secondary Outcomes Section). Specifically, the dice game involves rolling a virtual die which produces a random number. Participants then report this number, and in return, they receive a certain number of tickets for a specific lottery based on the reported value. The more tickets they accumulate, the better their chances of winning. Participants can lie to get more tickets in the game. The virtual dice will be unbalanced towards 1 to maximize the incentive to untruthfully report a number in this game.
The hypotheses of this experiment are the following:
1. "Perception" vs. control Hypothesis: Changing individuals' beliefs about corruption by emphasizing lower corruption levels ("perception") will positively affect perceptions of the Honduras tax authority compared to a neutral message (control), assuming that individuals believe the information provided in this treatment arm.
2. "Purge" vs. control Hypothesis: Communicating government efforts to combat corruption ("purge") will positively affect perceptions of the Honduras tax authority compared to a neutral message (control). However, as a recent literature highlights, such messages may backfire depending on individuals' initial beliefs about corruption - specifically, the purge treatment may reinforce an initial negative perception of the tax authority (Cheeseman and Peiffer, 2022). We will explore this heterogeneity for this and other treatment arms.
3. "Combined" vs. control Hypothesis: Combining both strategies ("combined") implies changing beliefs about corruption first (with the "perception" treatment) and emphasizing government actions next (with the "purge" treatment), and this sequence could positively affect perceptions of the Honduras tax authority compared to a neutral message (control). Its effect could be higher than the combined effect of treatments separately if it compensates for a potential backfire of the "purge" treatment. The "combined" effect, however, can backfire if the "purge" treatment makes the problem of corruption too salient (see Cheeseman and Peiffer, 2022).
4. "Combined" vs. "purge” Hypothesis: The combined message strategy ("combined") will be more effective than emphasizing government actions alone ("purge") because it could partially offset the potential backfire effects of "purge" alone.
6. "Perception" vs. "purge" Hypothesis: Changing perceptions about corruption ("perception") will be more effective compared to emphasizing government actions ("purge"), assuming that perceptions of corruption of the public administration play a significant role (Cheeseman and Peiffer, 2022) and that individuals believe the information provided in the "perception" treatment.
Our hypothesis implies that there may be heterogeneous effects according to individuals’ initial beliefs about corruption. We will study treatment heterogeneity along this dimension, for instance by studying whether high initial beliefs corruption perceptions trigger a backfire in the "purge" treatment (and, consequently, in the "combined" treatment). The main variable for heterogeneity is the respondents’ pre-treatment perception of government agents’ corruption, which will be used for subgroups analysis and as a control in regressions. At the same time, to observe whether the perceptions of corruption of the city's inhabitants changed, we will include a pre-treatment question that asks about the pre-treatment perceptions of Hondurans in general, which will also to serve as control in this case. As an alternative, we will use an index of trust in institutions from pre-treatment questions on trust in the Church, in Congress, in the Executive Branch and in the police.
We will collect a series of baseline characteristics, such as the age of the respondents, their sex, their ideology, the region in which they live and their education level. The firm in charge of the survey includes checks for attention and identifies outliers in the time spent on the questionnaire.
Design details
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