Post-Audit Tax Compliance: Endogenous Audits and Audit Effectiveness
How to cite
Mohr, Aline. 2023. "Post-Audit Tax Compliance: Endogenous Audits and Audit Effectiveness." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012026. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12026-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
As tax evasion remains a large problem in many countries with immediate consequences for the economy and living standards, tax authorities make use of audits to deter non-compliance.
Thus, it is crucial to examine the determinants of the post-audit effect on the tax compliance behavior of audited taxpayers. In this light, I investigate experimentally the causal effect of audit effectiveness on post-audit tax compliance in presence of an endogenous audit selection rule. Furthermore, I study whether this effect differs from the one observed in a setting with an exogenous audit selection rule. To do so, I will implement a randomized control trial within a tax evasion game in the form of an online experiment using a Census-Matched sample of at least 399 US citizens. Based on their order of entry in the study, participants are randomly assigned to one of the three treatments regarding audit effectiveness, low (T1), medium (T2) or high (T3). Additionally, participants experience both, a setting with an exogenous and an endogenous audit selection rule. The outcomes of interest are subjects’ (post-audit) tax compliance rates. I hypothesize that the direction of the post-audit effect depends on audit effectiveness, i.e., effective audits increase, and ineffective audits decrease post-audit tax compliance rates, in both settings. I expect that, comparing the endogenous to the exogenous audit setting, overall compliance is higher, while the effect of effective audits is stronger and the one of ineffective audits is weaker.
Experimental design
I investigate the causal effect of audit effectiveness on post-audit tax compliance in presence of an endogenous audit selection rule. Additionally, I study whether this causal effect differs from the one observed in a setting with an exogenous audit selection rule. Therefore, I implement an online experiment simulating voluntary income tax reporting. Hence, a Census-Matched sample of at least 399 US citizens will be recruited using CloudResearch’s Connect.
This online experiment consists of two parts with each multiple decision rounds. In each decision round participants are endowed with a certain income and need to decide on the amount of income reported to the tax agency. Thereafter, participants face the risk of being audited. In the first part, participants are confronted with an exogenous audit selection rule, while the audit selection rule becomes endogenous in the second part.
In the beginning of the experiment, participants are randomly assigned to one of the three treatment groups. Participants in the first treatment group experience audits of low effectiveness, whereas participants in the second and third treatment group face audits of medium and high effectiveness, respectively. The main outcomes of interest in this study are participants’ (post-audit) tax compliance rates. Compliance behavior is identified from the decisions taken by the participants in the multiple decision rounds and allows to determine the researched causal effects by adding respective dummy variables to the regression.
Design details
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