How many norms are there? Behavioral Implications of Uncertainty over Multiple Social Norms
How to cite
Panizza, Folco; Dimant, Eugen; Kimbrough, Erik; Vostroknutov, Alexander. 2023. "How many norms are there? Behavioral Implications of Uncertainty over Multiple Social Norms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0012012. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.12012-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Social norms guide human behavior in various contexts, even when violating them does not lead to immediate material costs. However, there are situations where it is unclear if a norm exists, or if different subgroups follow different norms. Existing methods of norm elicitation fail to capture this uncertainty, which can have significant consequences in both economic and social contexts. This experiment investigates the presence of multiple social norms employing a new elicitation method under two different economic games: a simple dictator game and a more complex economic problem involving trade-offs between a selfish, an equitable, a rawlsian, and an efficient option. Our design allows us to incentive-compatibly elicit multiple norms and sheds light on the extent to which people are aware of such multiplicity.
Intervention
Treatments vary in two dimensions: the scenario to evaluate, and the agents involved. There are two possible scenarios, a Dictator Game and an allocation game, inspired by Engelmann and Strobel (2004), that includes four options (selfish, equitable, maximin, and efficient). For each scenario, there are two types of agents: all recipients are participants, or one recipient is a charitable organization and the others are participants. This manipulation is to test whether agent composition affects the beliefs elicited. We thus conduct a two (scenario) by two (charity/no charity) experiment. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.
Experimental design
In this online experiment, participants are randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions that differ in the scenario they are asked to evaluate and in the agents involved. Participants will first be asked to estimate which different normative beliefs are associated with the described scenario using an incentivized task. Participants will then play as a third-party punisher against the player in the previously described scenario that was tasked to allocate the resources (e.g., the dictator in the dictator game). Finally, participants will play in another scenario that will be used for other experimental treatments.
Design details
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