Bank runs and public communication
How to cite
Sandri, Damiano; Grigoli, Francesco; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Coibion, Olivier. 2023. "Bank runs and public communication." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011965. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11965-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Using a survey with information treatments conducted in the aftermath of SVB’s collapse, we study households’ perspectives on bank stability, the potential for panic-driven bank runs, and the role of public communication. When informed about SVB’s collapse, households become more likely to withdraw deposits. Leveraging hypothetical questions and the exogenous variation in beliefs generated by the information treatments, we show that households reallocate deposit withdrawals primarily into other banks and cash, with little passthrough into spending. Information about FDIC insurance and communication about bank stability by the Federal Reserve can reassure depositors, while communication from political leaders only influences their electoral base.
Experimental design
Survey participants were randomly assigned to one control group and 4 treated groups. Treated groups were provided with information about the SVB's collapse, President Biden's and the Fed's statements about the solidity of the US banking sector, and information about deposit insurance. The survey assessed people's propensity to withdraw deposits before and after the treatments.
Design details
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