The effects of financial aid and returns information in selective and less selective schools: Experimental evidence from Chile

How to cite

A., Claudia Martinez; Romero, Dario; Busso, Matias; Dinkelman, Taryn. 2017. "The effects of financial aid and returns information in selective and less selective schools: Experimental evidence from Chile." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001196. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1196-1.0

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Claudia Martinez A.* , Dario Romero , Matias Busso , Taryn Dinkelman

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001196
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1196-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2013-07-01 – 2015-12-01
Countries
Chile (South America)
JEL codes
I23, I22, I26, D830
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1196

Abstract

Schools that provide higher education often belong to either a merit-based selective system or an open-access less selective system. Because spaces in the selective system tend to be rationed and contingent on a lifetime of academic preparation, improved access to higher education may be more quickly achieved through interventions relevant to the less selective system. We present the results of a field experiment that provided Grade 12 students in Chile with tailored information about financial aid and average earnings for schools and careers in both types of schools. Treated students are more likely to apply to and enroll in higher education. Effects are concentrated among students who must choose from schools in the less selective system. Treated students choose careers and schools with lower expected wages, lower employment probabilities, and lower quality, but offering shorter degree programs with lower tuition.

Intervention

(1) Control group: The control group received one email inviting them to learn about possible careers at www.eligecarrera.cl. This publicly accessible official website contains general information on types of careers, loans and scholarships available at different schools, eligibility criteria for these programs and financing options. Students in the treatment group also received a link to the same website in their treatment emails.

(2) Financial Aid treatment: We presented all treatment students with information about general types of financial aid and specific financial aid linked to their baseline preferences or background characteristics. PUC volunteers searched for this personalized information on loans and scholarships in the public and private sector.

(3) Returns treatment: To construct information for the Returns Treatment, we gathered data from the publicly accessible MiFuturo database (www.MiFuturo.cl) of 2013. This database reports average monthly earnings and average employability rates for recent graduates of specific career-school programs.

* Half of the students in the Financial Aid treatment were randomized into receiving the Returns Treatment.

Experimental design

We worked with a Chilean NGO, Por Una Carrera (PUC), to visit over 300 school career fairs in the greater Santiago region between July 2013 and November 2013. At the PUC booths, we collected over 10,000 emails from Grade 12 students, along with their preferences about post- secondary careers and institutions. We invited students to participate in our study by sending them a web link to our baseline survey; respondents had two weeks to complete the online survey. We stratified the sample using baseline information on gender and on whether a student’s parents had completed any tertiary education, or not, or had missing education information. Between October and December 2013, we randomized students into an information treatment and control group on a rolling basis, following a re-randomization protocol to maintain cumulative balance in the combined sample. All treated students received the Financial Aid Treatment: information about financial aid possibilities tailored to their baseline career-school preferences. Half of the treated students also received a Returns Treatment: information about expected returns related to their baseline preferences.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by computer; re-randomization procedure described in text.
Randomization unit
Students (grade 12)
Clusters
N/A no cluster
Observations
1,727 Grade 12 students
Arms
Control: 556 students Financial Aid Treatment: 553 Financial Aid and Returns Treatment: 559
Primary outcomes
Access to higher education variables (application to a selective school, acceptance into a selective school, enrollment in a selective school, enrollment in any higher education), variables on the quality of school of enrollment (average wage returns for the career- school, average employability, and years of accreditation), and cost of enrollment variables (annual tuition and program duration).

Papers from this trial

  1. Busso, Martias, Taryn Dinkelman, Claudio A. Martinez, Dario Romero. "The Effects of Financial Aid and Returns Information in Selective and less Selective Schools: Experimental Evidence from Chile." IDB Working Paper Nº IDB-WP-743, November 2016. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/868_The-Effects-of-Financial-Aid-and-Returns-Information-in-Selective-and-Less-Selective-Schools_Chile_November2016.pdf

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Keywords