Counterfactual Thinking and Inequality Acceptance
How to cite
Brun, Martin. 2023. "Counterfactual Thinking and Inequality Acceptance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011950. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11950-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
To what extent choices are shaped by circumstances is a crucial aspect of debates about inequality and redistributive policies. When information to assess this is limited, individuals can only infer about it. Do people engage in this process? Are they accurate? In this project, we investigate if people think about this and if it affects inequality acceptance. We design a theory-driven experiment that isolates self-interest considerations, capturing individual moral acceptability of inequalities. We will elicit fairness preferences and beliefs about choices in equal-opportunity counterfactual scenarios. We will explore if those beliefs are biased by the observed unequal circumstances and if that affects moral decisions. We will test if people demand better information to decide and if thinking about counterfactual scenarios impacts their decisions.
Intervention
Spectators decide on the distribution of the rewards between two workers with unequal opportunities. Workers complete a number of effort-tasks. We match workers in pairs consisting of workers with high and low opportunities. Spectators decide on final payments for each worker in a pair.
Spectators are always provided with information about workers opportunities, number of tasks completed, and initial payment reward. In different treatments, we additionally provide spectators with information on counterfactual scenarios, or we incentivize counterfactual thinking before spectator's decision-making.
Experimental design
We use the spectator design. Workers complete effort-tasks under unequal opportunities. We pair workers with high and low opportunities. Spectators decide on the distribution of the final rewards between both workers. We focus on the distribution decisions of the spectators. We experimentally vary the information available for spectators, or we incentivize counterfactual thinking before spectators make their decisions.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.