Counterfactual Thinking and Inequality Acceptance

How to cite

Brun, Martin. 2023. "Counterfactual Thinking and Inequality Acceptance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011950. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11950-1.0

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Martin Brun*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011950
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11950-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-08-21 – 2024-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91, D63, D83, D84
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11950

Abstract

To what extent choices are shaped by circumstances is a crucial aspect of debates about inequality and redistributive policies. When information to assess this is limited, individuals can only infer about it. Do people engage in this process? Are they accurate? In this project, we investigate if people think about this and if it affects inequality acceptance. We design a theory-driven experiment that isolates self-interest considerations, capturing individual moral acceptability of inequalities. We will elicit fairness preferences and beliefs about choices in equal-opportunity counterfactual scenarios. We will explore if those beliefs are biased by the observed unequal circumstances and if that affects moral decisions. We will test if people demand better information to decide and if thinking about counterfactual scenarios impacts their decisions.

Intervention

Spectators decide on the distribution of the rewards between two workers with unequal opportunities. Workers complete a number of effort-tasks. We match workers in pairs consisting of workers with high and low opportunities. Spectators decide on final payments for each worker in a pair.

Spectators are always provided with information about workers opportunities, number of tasks completed, and initial payment reward. In different treatments, we additionally provide spectators with information on counterfactual scenarios, or we incentivize counterfactual thinking before spectator's decision-making.

Experimental design

We use the spectator design. Workers complete effort-tasks under unequal opportunities. We pair workers with high and low opportunities. Spectators decide on the distribution of the final rewards between both workers. We focus on the distribution decisions of the spectators. We experimentally vary the information available for spectators, or we incentivize counterfactual thinking before spectators make their decisions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual.
Clusters
200 respondents.
Observations
1000 responses.
Arms
Around 65 respondents in each treatment.
Primary outcomes
Inequality acceptance.
Secondary outcomes
Belief biases, Acquired information.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords