Communication, Guilt, and Agency Risk with Payoff Externalities
How to cite
Cason, Timothy; Friesen, Lana; Gangadharan, Lata. 2023. "Communication, Guilt, and Agency Risk with Payoff Externalities." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011895. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11895-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This lab experiment investigates how different types of communication between principals and agents affect cooperation and efficiency in a setting where actions not only affect payoffs for the pair within the agency relationship, but also the earnings for an external principal-agent pair. Communication is hypothesized to impact beliefs, which in turn affects the psychological costs (e.g., guilt and lying aversion) that principals and agents feel when choosing their actions. A baseline treatment allows no communication opportunities. Two communication treatments introduce (a) a single, private message from the agent to the principal in each pair; and (b) preliminary free-form chat between both agents and principals whose payoffs are affected by actions, in addition to the single, private message in (a). Complete first- and second-order beliefs are elicited from all subjects following action choices. The experiment also elicits subjects’ risk tolerance and social value orientation.
Intervention
Communication opportunities will be varied across treatments. This includes a no-communication baseline, and treatments in which the agent in each pair can send a single, private message to their principal before choices are made, as well as rich and free form (chat) communication between both agents and both principals whose payoffs are affected by actions.
Experimental design
This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments, and then randomly assigned to roles (agents or principals) and into pairs to make a choice.
Within each principal-agent pair, the principal chooses IN or OUT and the agent chooses HIGH or LOW (effort). The OUT choice corresponds to an outside option for which the agent’s choice is irrelevant; the IN choice leads the pair’s earnings to depend on the agent’s effort choice. These choices have payoff externalities for one other principal-agent pair, so final earnings depend on the binary choices of four subjects in each group. Efficient cooperation is achieved only if both principals choose IN and both agents choose HIGH.
Design details
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