Skill-Biased Inequality and Redistributive Preferences
How to cite
Yusof, Jeffrey; Sartor, Simona. 2023. "Skill-Biased Inequality and Redistributive Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011869. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11869-3.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The rewards for different skills and the resulting skill-biased inequality are often determined by exogenous market mechanisms over which individuals cannot exert control. We refer to this driver of income inequality as market luck. From the perspective of economic efficiency, skill-biased inequality might appear justified as higher rewards reflect higher productivity. However, according to the principles of meritocracy, inequalities are only justified if they are due to differences in individual effort and performance but not due to factors outside of individuals' control. In this paper, we design an experiment to study this trade-off in fairness views and improve the understanding of individuals' preferences for redistribution by asking the following research question: Are inequalities arising from market luck perceived as fair? In our experiment, we design a setting where skill-biased inequality between workers arises because exogenous shocks to market demand make certain skills more valuable. We hypothesize that there are fundamental features of market-driven inequalities that increase individuals' inequality acceptance, even though they are fully aware that the market-driven inequalities result from exogenous and random factors.
Experimental design
We separately recruit three types of subjects; workers, producers, and spectators. In all of our treatments, workers are randomly assigned to one of two tasks, i.e. one of two skills, and then provide effort. In every treatment, we pair two workers with different skills where only one worker earns an additional income for her effort (6 USD). What we vary is the source of inequality between treatments. As our primary outcome, we measure the redistributive behavior of separately recruited third-party spectators. Each spectator is randomly assigned to one treatment and can decide how much income they want to redistribute between two workers who earned unequal incomes.
In our main treatment, the market luck treatment, the worker pair is matched with a producer who demands a specific type of
skill. Matching a pair of differently skilled workers randomly with a producer determines whether a worker can meet a producer’s demand and sell her labor. The fact that only one worker can sell her labor and earn an additional income introduces income inequality between the two workers.
In our control luck treatment, a coin flip decides which worker earns the high income. In the benchmark treatment, both workers work on the task for the same amount of time and the worker with the higher productivity earns the high income. In both treatments, control luck and benchmark, there are no producers. We design additional treatments to investigate the mechanisms and robustness of our main treatment effect.
More details are provided in the pre-analysis plan.
Design details
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