Information, preferences and delegation in a large organization: Design of a field experiment in Pakistan
How to cite
Vyborny, Kate; Quinn, Simon; Ahmed, Hamna. 2024. "Information, preferences and delegation in a large organization: Design of a field experiment in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011853. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11853-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We use a novel incentivized revealed preference experiment in a large hierarchical organization. Respondents
must make binary choices with real incentives similar to those faced in their normal duties. We then test how
decisions change when we change the information environment by (a) varying information provided about field
conditions in each choice, (b) varying how information flows within the hierarchy between respondents who are
managers and subordinates, and (c) varying the conditions under which decisions are made. We consider the
implications for optimal organizational design.
Experimental design
The setting we study is the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, a fund for community development work in Pakistan funded by the Government of Pakistan, the World Bank, and a number of bilateral aid agencies. This agency channels some of its funding through several second-tier donors, the National Rural Support Programme and several regional Rural Support Programmes, to small local NGOs in communities across Pakistan. These second-tier donors are organized as complex hierarchies.
We randomly selected a subset of these recipients for a monitoring and recognition experiment on a set of
simple performance indicators agreed by the top level of the donor (AEARCTR-0001103). Having collected detailed performance indicators from NGOs, we are in an exciting position to be able to test directly how each part of an organizational hierarchy reacts to new information.
In this experiment, we use experimental variation in how we release data collected in the NGO experiment to the donor organization to test how respondents who are staff members of the donor organization that supports the NGOs respond to the new information and work together in the hierarchy.
For every binary choice, the respondent sees a sheet comparing a pair of NGOs. We vary the information about the NGOs across pair sheets within respondent. The main elements of information to be shown are:
Names of the recipient organization -- allowing respondents to use their own local knowledge about NGO performance.
Complex data on performance.
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that summarize the same information shown in the complex data.
A brief narrative description of NGO activities, covering the same activities summarized in the complex data, written by project assistants based on information reported by the NGO.
For mid-level and senior officials, recommendations from their subordinates.
Design details
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