Red or Blue Pill? A Positive Welfare Analysis

How to cite

Bolte, Lukas; Arrieta, Gonzalo R.. 2023. "Red or Blue Pill? A Positive Welfare Analysis." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011851. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11851-2.0

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Lukas Bolte* , Gonzalo R. Arrieta

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011851
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11851-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-07-31 – 2023-10-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11851

Abstract

Modern welfare economics defers to revealed preference when assessing an individual's welfare, i.e., option A is deemed better than option B if, given the choice, the individual would choose A over B. However, in some cases, such choice data is difficult or even impossible to obtain. Consider, for example, the welfare of a taxpayer whose tax dollars may either go to what he considers a good or bad cause. Supposing there is no way for the taxpayer to learn where the tax dollars went, does the way the government spends them matter for the individual's welfare? Note that we cannot ask the taxpayer in an incentive-compatible way which cause he prefers while keeping him ignorant of which cause is ultimately chosen.

In this experiment, we use a choosing-for-others framework to study the welfare consequences of satisfying someone's (call him Alex) preferences in a similar paradigm as in the example above. We study whether participants decrease Alex's surprise bonus for his preference to be satisfied (i.e., a willingness-to-pay measure using Alex's bonus). We do so for two cases: when Alex will learn whether his preference is satisfied and when Alex will not learn whether his preference is satisfied. We also vary Alex's expectation, whether he believes it is likely (or not) his preference is satisfied, and we tell the participants about this expectation. Assuming that participants choose for others as they would choose for themselves, this allows us to shed light on the welfare consequences of choice problems where preference satisfaction and beliefs do not move in tandem (i.e., where preferences can be satisfied while beliefs remain fixed).

Experimental design

We recruit participants on Prolific. We provide experimental instructions to our participants and ensure good understanding through understanding questions. We assign participants to different treatments that vary by Alex's beliefs about whether he gets Object A instead of Object B. For each treatment, we elicit participants' WTP for both cases---when Alex learns which object he got and when he does not.

Design details

Randomization method
All randomizations are done using a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual.
Clusters
The experiment is not clustered.
Observations
1,500 participants.
Arms
500 participants in the treatment where we do not induce a particular belief Alex holds. 1,000 participants for the treatments that vary Alex's belief.
Primary outcomes
WTP (in terms of reducing Alex's surprise bonus) for Alex's preference to be satisfied for the case where Alex learns about it and the case when he does not.
Secondary outcomes
Three (unincentivized) questions that also capture welfare consequences of similar situations (1. Nozick's Experience Machine, 2. Unknown tax-funded relief effort, 3. Andy Warhol drawings) and correlations of these questions with the primary outcomes.

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Keywords