Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment

How to cite

Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Lergetporer, Philipp; Baier, Helena; Angerer, Silvia. 2023. "Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011829. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11829-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Thomas Rittmannsberger* , Daniela Glätzle-Rützler , Philipp Lergetporer , Helena Baier , Silvia Angerer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011829
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11829-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-08-07 – 2023-09-01
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11829

Abstract

The human ability to establish cooperation depends upon the execution of cooperative norms, especially in large groups of unrelated strangers. High levels of cooperation among humans are often attributed to the possibility of third-party punishment (TPP). We study the effectiveness of TPP to increase cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game in a representative sample of the German population. Our study aims to answer whether TPP fosters cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in society at large.

Intervention

We investigate whether cooperation rates increase through the implementation of a third-party punishment (TPP) mechanism. Therefore, we plan to run a large-scale artefactual field experiment with a nationally representative sample of the German population, where participants play an incentivized prisoner dilemma (PD) game.

To do so, we run two experimental treatments. In the first treatment, there is no TPP, while in the second treatment, TPP is possible. We randomly divide all participants into two groups. The first group is assigned to the first treatment and plays the PD game without TPP, while the second group is assigned to the second treatment and plays the PD game with TPP.

Experimental design

We plan to sample a minimum of 2,000 adults aged between 18 and 69 years (up to a maximum of 2,500 — conditional on final costs; also see “Experiment characteristics”).
The experiment is conducted in cooperation with a survey institute. The recruitment and polling are managed by the survey institute. We collect the data via an online platform (QUALTRICS). Our participants take part in the experiment autonomously on their own digital devices. Randomization is carried out by the survey institute at the individual level, using a computer. Payment of incentives is carried out anonymously by the survey institute.
Our experiment is structured as follows:
Respondents will be randomly assigned (between subjects) to Treatment 1 (p=0.5), or Treatment 2 (p=0.5).

Treatment 1 (with TTP):
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behavior of the partner
Stage 3: Appropriateness of decisions
Stage 4: Beliefs about the behavior of the referee
Stage 5: Personal questions

Treatment 2 (without TTP):
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behavior of the partner
Stage 3: Appropriateness of decisions
Stage 4: Punishment Decision
Stage 5: Personal questions

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is carried out by the survey company, using a computer.
Randomization unit
At the individual level
Clusters
2,000 individuals (adults aged between 18 and 69 years). (maximum: 2,500 – conditional final costs)
Observations
2,000 individuals (adults aged between 18 and 69 years). (maximum: 2,500 – conditional final costs)
Arms
2,000 individuals (1,000 per treatment). (maximum: 2,500 (1,750/1,750) – conditional on final survey costs). According to our conservative cost calculations, we have sufficient funding for sampling 2,000 individuals. Depending on the final costs of the survey, we envisage continuing sampling up to a maximum number of 2,500 individuals.
Primary outcomes
Cooperation rate in the PD game: The share of participants who decide to send their endowment to their partner [Question q01].
Secondary outcomes
We will analyze beliefs concerning the decision of the other player: the share of participants believing that their partner decides to send [Question q02]. In treatment 2 (with TTP) we will analyze the beliefs concerning the decisions of the referee [Questions q05 & q06]. Furthermore, we will investigate effect-heterogeneities by age, gender, and socioeconomic status, as well as whether respondents answered the control questions correctly and whether they self-report having understood the instructions of the game [Question p26]. Furthermore, we will investigate the correlation between cooperation and punishment decisions and survey-based measures of real-life (cooperative) behavior in the context of health [Questions p09-p13] and the environment (where we build an index from the Questions p01-p08).

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords