Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment
How to cite
Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Lergetporer, Philipp; Baier, Helena; Angerer, Silvia. 2023. "Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011829. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11829-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The human ability to establish cooperation depends upon the execution of cooperative norms, especially in large groups of unrelated strangers. High levels of cooperation among humans are often attributed to the possibility of third-party punishment (TPP). We study the effectiveness of TPP to increase cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game in a representative sample of the German population. Our study aims to answer whether TPP fosters cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in society at large.
Intervention
We investigate whether cooperation rates increase through the implementation of a third-party punishment (TPP) mechanism. Therefore, we plan to run a large-scale artefactual field experiment with a nationally representative sample of the German population, where participants play an incentivized prisoner dilemma (PD) game.
To do so, we run two experimental treatments. In the first treatment, there is no TPP, while in the second treatment, TPP is possible. We randomly divide all participants into two groups. The first group is assigned to the first treatment and plays the PD game without TPP, while the second group is assigned to the second treatment and plays the PD game with TPP.
Experimental design
We plan to sample a minimum of 2,000 adults aged between 18 and 69 years (up to a maximum of 2,500 — conditional on final costs; also see “Experiment characteristics”).
The experiment is conducted in cooperation with a survey institute. The recruitment and polling are managed by the survey institute. We collect the data via an online platform (QUALTRICS). Our participants take part in the experiment autonomously on their own digital devices. Randomization is carried out by the survey institute at the individual level, using a computer. Payment of incentives is carried out anonymously by the survey institute.
Our experiment is structured as follows:
Respondents will be randomly assigned (between subjects) to Treatment 1 (p=0.5), or Treatment 2 (p=0.5).
Treatment 1 (with TTP):
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behavior of the partner
Stage 3: Appropriateness of decisions
Stage 4: Beliefs about the behavior of the referee
Stage 5: Personal questions
Treatment 2 (without TTP):
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behavior of the partner
Stage 3: Appropriateness of decisions
Stage 4: Punishment Decision
Stage 5: Personal questions
Design details
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