Sanctioning of loophole exploiters

How to cite

Schmacker, Renke; König, Tobias; Mechtenberg, Lydia. 2023. "Sanctioning of loophole exploiters." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011828. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11828-1.0

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Renke Schmacker* , Tobias König , Lydia Mechtenberg

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011828
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11828-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-07-23 – 2023-07-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11828

Abstract

In this experiment, we examine the conditions under which individuals consider the exploitation of loopholes acceptable. The experiment involves two types of participants: workers and spectators. Workers are matched into groups of four and are supposed to pay a tax designed to equalize their incomes. However, they have the option to work on a calculation task to reduce their tax rate at the expense of other participants. The calculation task contains a loophole, which allows workers to strongly lower their tax rate. Spectators judge whether exploiting the loophole is appropriate or not. They can decide whether to sanction workers who exploited the loophole. In separate treatments, we vary whether pre-tax incomes reflect earned merits and the efficiency costs of redistribution.

This experiment relates to experiment AEARCTR-0011610 (https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11610-1.0). While the other experiment looked at the treatment variation for the decision to close the loophole, this experiment studies the treatment variation for the sanctioning decision.

Intervention

3 treatments: Baseline, Effort, Inefficiency.

Experimental design

Spectator-worker design with randomized interventions

Design details

Randomization method
Computerized randomization using Qualtrics. We use the option “evenly present elements.”
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Target sample: 230 to 280 spectators per treatment conditional on the ability to fill our quotas (see experimental design). We will include data from a pilot with n=50 per treatment in the final data.
Observations
See above
Arms
See above
Primary outcomes
Share of spectators that sanction loophole exploiters: Spectators are matched with a group of workers from a previous session and can decide whether loophole exploiters should be sanctioned. Appropriateness of using the loophole: Spectators’ first-order and second-order beliefs of the appropriateness of exploiting the loophole.
Secondary outcomes
Appropriateness of tax adjustment: Spectators’ first-order and second-order beliefs of the appropriateness of tax adjustment in general. Appropriateness of ex-post sanctioning: Spectators’ first-order and second-order beliefs of the appropriateness of sanctioning a loophole exploiter ex-post. As manipulation checks, we estimate treatment effects on factors related to the treatments. These include participant perceptions regarding the deservedness of gross incomes in the experiment, whether they successfully detected the loophole and their estimations of how many others they believe did, their views on whether individuals who exploit the loophole are clever, and their opinions on whether the tax revenues are being wasted. We will investigate mechanisms explaining the decision to sanction the loophole exploiters using the factors above, as well as the belief of how many subjects exploit the loophole and by how much. Exploratively, we will investigate whether behavior in the experiment is correlated with political views and voting behavior in previous presidential elections. We will also investigate the relationship with their beliefs regarding the appropriateness of loopholes, preferences for redistribution, and perceptions of the efficiency of public spending. Exploratively, we will also investigate the behavior of the workers. Here, we focus on their choice to use the loophole and on whether they consider using the loophole appropriate.

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Keywords