Demand for legal assistance

How to cite

Rafkin, Charlie. 2023. "Demand for legal assistance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011818. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11818-1.0

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Charlie Rafkin*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011818
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11818-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-07-21 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11818

Abstract

We study the determinants of demand for legal services among tenants facing eviction in Memphis, Tennessee. We conduct a randomized controlled trial (RCT) using a survey with a control group and two treatments: (1) providing information on the effectiveness of eviction attorneys, and (2) building trust in the organization that provides the eviction attorneys. We study the impacts of these treatments on three primary incentivized outcomes: (1) willingness to accept between cash and an attorney, (2) forecasts of the effects of attorneys in reducing rates of evictions in the future, (3) strategies played in Trust Games (Berg et al., 1995) with eviction attorneys relative to various reference groups. We also collect the secondary outcome of (4) participation in a program offering free legal assistance.

Intervention

The survey experiment has two treatments and an active control group.

The first treatment (“information-only”) is a short, animated video that consists of two parts. First, it provides tenants with information on the effectiveness of attorneys in preventing evictions as measured by a recent RCT in Memphis. That RCT (AEARCTR-0010687) was conducted in partnership with the The Works Initiative (TWI), a nonprofit organization in Memphis, and randomized provision of attorneys to tenants who applied. We provide preliminary results from that study to respondents in this study by having respondents watch a short, animated video describing the study and its results. Second, the video also asks participants to take the survey seriously and reminds them that there are real stakes associated with their choices.

The second treatment (“trust”) additionally aims to build trust in TWI. It has the same two parts as the first treatment. It adds a third part, which has several components: (i) it informs tenants that TWI focuses on combating racial inequality, is led by community organizers, and serves primarily people of color; and (ii) it provides tenants with a positive testimonial from a tenant who was helped by TWI’s legal services program.

The (active) control group watches a short, animated video which only has the last part of each of the other videos (which asks tenants to take the survey seriously and reminds them that there are real stakes associated with their choices).

We have one “secondary” treatment. We experimentally relax budget constraints for some tenants by giving them a $500 bonus in the event that their WTA elicitation is implemented.

Experimental design

Intake. Memphis Inter-Faith Alliance (MIFA) is a nonprofit that provides rental and utility assistance to distressed tenants in Memphis, TN. They have agreed to link our survey on the ending screen of their online application for assistance. Tenants applying for MIFA aid will be offered the chance to participate in our survey: they will be told the survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete and they will be compensated with a $15 gift card.

Design. Participants will first be asked a variety of background questions. The background questions will collect information about their housing situation, ask whether they have recently received an eviction notice, and elicit prior beliefs about the effect of an attorney in reducing eviction rates. Participants will then be randomly assigned one of three videos: a control video encouraging them to take the survey seriously and reminding them there are real stakes; an information-only treatment only; and a trust treatment. See above for details on the videos.

WTA. We now describe several details about the willingness to accept (WTA) elicitation. These are conducted as multiple price lists, incentivized using a Becker-Degroot-Marshak mechanism. Each tenant has two WTAs elicited: for an attorney who can represent them in the following year and for a reference good (an iPad). Tenants are randomized into reporting WTPs when we give them only $50 if they are selected (and then trade off more money versus the good), versus when we give them $500 if they are selected. The purpose of this elicitation is to test if materially relaxing budget constraints affects WTA. As a secondary outcome, we test the effect of relaxing the budget constraint on the reported WTA.

Purpose of treatments and intended tests. Our objective is to determine what drives demand for lawyers. The purpose of the information-only treatment is to shock beliefs about the efficacy of lawyers. The purpose of the trust treatment is to shock beliefs about the efficacy of lawyers and trust in the legal system. The difference between the information-only treatment and the control measures the effect of information. The difference in treatment effects between the trust and information-only treatment measures the effect of “trust.” Our focus is first on the WTA outcome, which we interpret as demand for lawyers. These are Intent-To-Treat estimates. We may also add demographic controls, using a principled control-selection procedure (e.g., Belloni et al., 2014).

In addition to establishing the ITT effects on demand across treatments, we directly capture the role of information and trust via treatment effects on belief updates and trust games, respectively. Finally, we further capture the role of information by eliciting prior and posterior beliefs, and measuring the effect of the information treatment relative to priors. For instance, we can study effects of information on demand among people with above-/below-median belief biases (or the instrumental-variables version of this specification). Thus, the experiment embeds multiple ways of testing for whether information and/or trust drive demand: via (1) the differential effects by treatment condition, and (2) the effects on outcomes intended to measure each channel directly.

We will primarily study the intent-to-treat of the two treatments versus control and each other. Additionally, for power, we may pool both treatments and compare them to control. Secondary tests will use the information-only treatments as instruments for beliefs.

Survey changes. We anticipate that the lawyers RCT will conclude on December 31. Therefore, on October 1, we will change the belief elicitation questions to be about the last three months of the program altogether (rather than the next three months going forward). In the fall, we will also need to take down the referrals outcome, as the program will no longer accept applicants.

References

Alsan, Marcella, Owen Garrick, and Grant Graziani. "Does diversity matter for health? Experimental evidence from Oakland." American Economic Review 109, no. 12 (2019): 4071-4111.

Belloni, Alexandre, Victor Chernozhukov, and Christian Hansen. "Inference on treatment effects after selection among high-dimensional controls." Review of Economic Studies 81, no. 2 (2014): 608-650.

Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe. "Trust, reciprocity, and social history." Games and economic behavior 10, no. 1 (1995): 122-142.

Dizon-Ross, Rebecca, and Seema Jayachandran. "Improving Willingness-to-Pay Elicitation by Including a Benchmark Good." In AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 112, pp. 551-555. 2022.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in Qualtrics
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
2,500 participants, excluding those who fail a general attention check.
Observations
2,500 participants, excluding those who fail a general attention check. There is a chance we will need to conclude the survey before we have 2,500 participants, because the partner may ask us to take the survey down before then.
Arms
About 833 participants in each of the two treatment arms + control. (Excluding those who fail a general attention check. Randomization probabilities equal across all arms.)
Primary outcomes
We aim to measure treatment effects of information and trust on demand for legal representation. Group 1 outcomes measure demand directly. Group 2 outcomes decompose the demand into mechanisms. Group 1: direct measure of demand Willingness to Accept (WTA) for cash versus an attorney from TWI Group 2: demand mechanisms Trust: Behavior in trust games against TWI attorneys Beliefs: Predictions about TWI attorney effectiveness over the following three months
Secondary outcomes
A. Demand for legal assistance: Share of participants who enter a lottery for free legal representation from TWI Whether the participant refers anyone to TWI’s legal program Number of referrals to TWI’s legal program Whether participant intends to apply to TWI’s legal program, measured in the survey Whether participant ultimately applies to TWI’s legal program, measured by linking the survey and the legal program B. Behavior in trust games against: personal injury attorneys, police officers, doctors, another survey participant, and landlords whose tenants applied for legal assistance C. Effect of budget constraints: The effect of relaxing the budget constraint (a secondary treatment) on the reported WTA for lawyers versus cash. D. We will analyze the following sources of heterogeneity as secondary: - Heterogeneity based on existence of eviction notice. Some survey participants will have active eviction notices (self reported) or filings (which we can link from from court data). They may value attorneys differently and be more or less sensitive to treatments. - Measurements of credit constraints. We measure credit constraints at baseline by asking standard questions about access to credit. - Measurements of financial need. We will focus on: income and/or rent to income ratios, as well as measures of “bandwidth” to do financial planning, which we elicit with a free-response question about tenants’ worries and will analyze using natural-language processing. This heterogeneity could be one candidate explanation if we find trust and information do not affect demand: participants could have low bandwidth to seek out legal counsel even if they think it is effective and they trust it. - Heterogeneity based on prior beliefs. We collect incentivized prior beliefs about the effectiveness of TWI attorneys over the next three months, before treatment. We use these beliefs to identify people whose beliefs are especially biased. That gives a secondary test for the role of information (see experimental details).

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Keywords