Equity and Incentives in Household Finance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Rwanda

How to cite

Herbst, Daniel; Yannelis, Constantine; Palacios, Miguel. 2023. "Equity and Incentives in Household Finance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Rwanda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011794. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11794-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Daniel Herbst* , Constantine Yannelis , Miguel Palacios

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011794
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11794-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-11-27 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
I220, G52
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11794

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment in Rwanda that randomly offers individuals different monthly payment obligations (debt) in exchange for pledging varying shares of their future incomes (equity). Our experimental design identifies selection and treatment effects across both debt and equity dimensions of the experimental offers. Specifically, we randomly offer enrollees in income-share agreements (ISAs) the opportunity to lower their pledged income shares by 4 or 8 percentage points in exchange for flat monthly fees ranging from 1000 to 20,000 Rwandan francs. To identify moral hazard, we estimate the treatment effect of accepting a contract with a lower income-share obligation, using contract offers as instruments. To identify adverse selection, we compare individuals who received different menus of offers but ultimately pledged the same income share. Estimating treatment effects and selection patterns in earnings, repayment, and risk factors enables us to quantify the welfare losses associated with information asymmetries in equity-like contracts and identify market failures in household financing.

Intervention

We randomly offer existing ISA enrollees the opportunity to lower their pledged income shares by 4 or 8 percentage points in exchange for flat monthly fees ranging from 1000 to 20,000 RwF. To identify moral hazard, we estimate the treatment effect of accepting a contract with a lower income-share obligation, using contract offers as instruments. To identify adverse selection, we compare individuals who received different menus of offers but ultimately pledged the same income share.

Experimental design

Our experiment involves randomly extending revised contract offerings to graduates enrolled in Chancen ISAs. These contract offerings will take the form of “discounts” to income-share obligations in exchange for an additional up-front payment.

Consider an ISA enrollee three years after graduation who is obligated to pay 9 percent of her annual income to Chancen over the next two years. In the first wave of the experiment, one experimental treatment would offer that student a revised contract reducing her income-share obligation to 1 percent in exchange for an additional 2,000 RwF per month. Another treatment offers the same eight-percentage-point reduction for 1,000 RwF, and another treatment group offers a four-percentage-point reduction for 4,000 RwF.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
136 individuals
Observations
136 individuals
Arms
Treatment 1: ISA reduction=4%, Flat Monthly Payment=1000 RwF, N = 27 Treatment 2: ISA reduction=4%, Flat Monthly Payment=4000 RwF, N = 13 Treatment 3: ISA reduction=4%, Flat Monthly Payment=10000 RwF, N = 28 Treatment 4: ISA reduction=8%, Flat Monthly Payment=2000 RwF, N = 27 Treatment 5: ISA reduction=8%, Flat Monthly Payment=8000 RwF, N = 15 Treatment 6: ISA reduction=8%, Flat Monthly Payment=20000 RwF, N = 26
Primary outcomes
Repayment amount and frequency; income and employment;

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords