A Comparison of Contests and Contracts to Deliver Cost-Effective Energy Conservation
How to cite
Yoder, Elizabeth; Garg, Teevrat; Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo; Ta, Chi. 2023. "A Comparison of Contests and Contracts to Deliver Cost-Effective Energy Conservation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011783. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11783-2.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
The energy sector in low- and middle-income countries is characterized by two stylized facts: (a) higher rates of particulate and carbon emissions per unit electricity generated and (b) low aggregate energy production and transmission losses resulting in lack of access and reliability of electricity. These concerns have led policy makers to encourage demand-side management through, for example, energy conservation programs in urban households such as tiered pricing, behavioral nudges, and direct “bonus” payments to keep energy use below a target maximum.
Urban energy conservation could help address the problem of grid balancing, that is reducing peak demand, especially as LMICs (including Vietnam where we are conducting our study) transition to a larger share of their electricity being generated from renewable resources. This is crucial to achieving the emissions reduction promise of renewable energy. However, the issue of incentivizing agents (households) to exert costly, unobservable effort (energy abatement) is a long-standing and open question in economics. In many settings, including ours, the principal (utility) observes a performance measure (energy use) correlated with agent’s effort but not the effort directly because the principal is unable to observe shocks beyond the control of the agent (e.g. weather, household demand shock). One possible solution is to use rank-ordered tournaments that incentivize relative performance, thereby obviating the need for the principal to observe common shocks. In this project, we draw on a rich theoretical and nascent empirical literature on contracts and rank-ordered tournaments to test aggregate conservation across contracts and contests and recover parameters that allow us to understand their effects at scale.
Experimental design
The research team will randomize each household in one of four groups, three treatment groups and one control group. Two treatment groups will be assigned to contracts, with each group differing in the thresholds of energy savings they must reach to win a price. The third treatment group will be assigned to contests. The duration of treatments is 30 days from mid-July to mid-August. The control group will not be assigned contest or contract participation. Participants can use their smart meters to monitor their progress by default, so all households, including the control group, will receive information about their past and current daily electricity use on the electric utility company’s app
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.