Small-scale farmers’ willingness to pay for rapid soil tests: A comparison of individual purchase decisions with contributions to a collective good

How to cite

Grimm, Michael; Luck, Nathalie; Sawhney, Udit. 2023. "Small-scale farmers’ willingness to pay for rapid soil tests: A comparison of individual purchase decisions with contributions to a collective good." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011773. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11773-1.1

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Michael Grimm* , Nathalie Luck , Udit Sawhney

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011773
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11773-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-06-01 – 2023-12-01
Countries
Indonesia (Southeast Asia)
Secondary IDs
D90; O13; Q12; Q16; Q58
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11773

Abstract

Over-application of fertilizers is common in Indonesia. Soil tests combined with individualized fertilizer recommendations can help to reduce the over-application of fertilizers. However, local agricultural extension offices are budget constrained and at this point in time, soil tests are not offered widely. If farmers are willing to pay part of the soil test costs this could increase the spread of soil testing among small-scale farmers. This study explores small-scale farmers’ willingness to pay for soil tests in Indonesia. To elicit farmers’ willingness to pay for soil testing we will use an incentive-compatible auction, based on the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) approach. We will compare two experimental arms, the WTP Service (WTP-S) and the WTP Collective Good (WTP-CG). We designed the experimental arms in a way that they cover two possible ways in which the soil tests could be distributed among farmers outside of our experiment by government extension offices. In the first experimental arm, we will offer farmers the chance to bid for the service of having their soil tested with a rapid soil test. In the second experimental arm, farmers are asked to make a bid for their contribution to buy the complete soil test kit as a group. A further design feature of our sample is that half of the farmers were randomly assigned to a one-day training on soil fertility management in 2022. Hence, we will test whether farmers who were offered that training systematically differ in their price bids from those farmers who were not offered that training. The results will provide insights for stakeholders that provide extension to small-scale farmers in low- and middle-income countries. The results can further guide the Indonesian Government on how to improve small-scale farmers’ soil management to enhance the environmental sustainability of farming; one of the key challenges Indonesia faces in the decades to come.

Intervention

We will compare the price bids across the two treatment groups (WTP Service (WTP-S) and the WTP Collective Good (WTP-CG), see explanation below).

Additionally, we will explore the relationship between the price bids with socio-economic factors such as age, education, whether farming is the primary economic activity and the land size that the HH cultivates. Furthermore, we will explore the relationship between the price bids and the randomly assigned treatment status of the village in a related project (for more details see below). Specifically, we will test whether having received a one-day training on soil fertility management in 2022 increases the price bids (in either experiment).

Experimental design

The project will use rice soil test kits (PUTS) which were developed by the Indonesian Soil Research Institute (a department of the Ministry of Agriculture). The soil test kits have been extensively tested and validated. One soil test kit comprises materials to conduct 50 soil tests.

To elicit farmers’ willingness to pay for soil testing we will use an incentive-compatible auction mechanism, based on the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) approach. Using the BDM approach, participants make a private price bid to purchase a product. This private price bid will not be shared with the other farmers or anybody else outside the research team. The private price bid is subsequently compared to a randomly drawn price. In the context of our study, we decided to make the price draw public to increase transparency. Participants can only purchase the soil test if their bid is at or above the randomly drawn price. Successful bidders pay the price drawn, not the price of their bid. Unlike other approaches, the BDM approach uses an incentivized measure to reveal participants’ preferences. If participants overstate their real willingness to pay, they might have to buy the product at a higher price than their actual valuation. If they understate their willingness to pay, they might miss the opportunity to purchase the product at a price equal to or lower than their actual valuation.

Before the bidding process, participants will be invited to an information session. During the information session, participants will receive an introduction to the soil test kit PUTS from a trained facilitator and an introduction to the bidding process from a local member of our research team (‘enumerator’ hereafter).

To ensure that participants understand the experiment before they make their bid, enumerators will demonstrate the bidding process in detail using a different product. Enumerators will not influence the participants in their price bidding and especially will not encourage them to increase their bids. If participants decide that for them the soil test has no value at all, they could also make a price bid of zero. Before we proceed to the bidding process, we will seek informed consent from all participants. Participation is voluntary.

We will compare two experimental arms, the WTP Service (WTP-S) and the WTP Collective Good (WTP-CG). We start with a higher share of WTP-CG (60%) as some of these villages will be allocated to the WTP-S group whenever there are not enough potential participants, i.e. contributors for the CG. We set this threshold at 10, i.e. if less than 10 farmers participate, the participants are shifted to the WTP-S experiment. We designed the experimental arms in a way that they cover two possible ways in which the soil tests could be distributed among farmers outside of our experiment, for example by government extension offices.

Treatment 1: Service
In the first treatment arm, we will offer farmers the chance to bid for the service of having their soil tested with a rapid soil test. The soil testing will be performed by a trained facilitator. Farmers will not have to follow training themselves. Instead, they only provide the soil sample and then receive the soil test results and individualized fertilizer recommendations based on their soil test results and plot size. Following their price bid, farmers are asked how many soil samples they would like to get tested if they are successful. The bidding process is private, however, there will only be one price drawn at the village level to avoid that successful farmers pay a different price within the same village.

Treatment 1 resembles the scenario where a public extension worker comes to the village and performs the soil tests for the farmers and the farmers are asked to contribute to the costs of the soil test kit. Farmers will be asked to make a bid for the material cost while the service of performing the soil test will be free.

Treatment 2: Collective Good
In the second treatment arm, farmers are asked to make a bid for their contribution to buy the complete soil test kit as a group. Thus, we will compare whether the sum of all bids made by the participants in one village is equal to or lower than the price that is publicly drawn. If the group is successful, the group receives the soil test kit and a trained facilitator will provide the group with training on how to use the soil test kit.

To account for the fact that some farmers might be less well-endowed and to decrease the pressure, if any, on them to bid more than they really want to pay, we will double the two lowest bids in the group contribution setting (of course keeping it confidential whose bids are doubled). This doubling will act as an additional subsidy. If the group is successful, the participants only pay at the maximum their stated bids while the project carries the doubling of the two lowest (non-zero) bids. If the drawn price is lower than the sum of bids by the group, each participant will pay a share proportional to his/her bid.

Treatment 2 resembles the scenario where a public extension worker trains a group of farmers that have purchased a (subsidized) soil test kit on how to conduct soil tests with this kit.

Sampling procedure:
The willingness-to-pay experiment will be conducted in 46 villages in the province of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The maximum number of participants per village is 16. These 16 potential participants are part of a different sample that is covered by a survey that the project team is conducting in Indonesia (add link to other PAP). We will invite all 16 participants to join an information session. However, we expect that not all participants will follow the invitation. The expected attendance rate is around 12 farmers per village.

Treatment allocation
Whether farmers in a village participate in WTP-S or WTP-CG will be randomly assigned. This assignment will be stratified by the treatment status of the village in the related project from which the sample of farmers for this experiment is drawn. In half of the villages, farmers were offered a one-day-training on soil fertility management in 2022. The other half of the villages served as control group. This procedure results in a two-by-two setting where half of the farmers in each of the two experimental arms had been exposed to the soil fertility management training.

Data collection
The data collection will encompass the price bid and a very short structured questionnaire. Given that the respondents are surveyed already within another related project, there is no need to collect additional socio-economic data in this project.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office.
Randomization unit
Village level
Clusters
46 villages
Observations
max. 736, expected sample size of around 550 (depending on attendance rate)
Arms
23 villages per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
The project will address the following research questions: • What are small-scale farmers willing to pay for individualized rapid soil tests? • What are small-scale farmers willing to contribute to a soil test kit and training in a group setting? • Does a one-day training on soil fertility management increase the willingness-to-pay for a soil test (in either form)? • What subsidies are required to promote this technology further? The primary outcomes are: • Willingness to pay / Price bid for the service of one individualized soil test • Willingness to contribute/Price bid for a soil test kit and training in a group setting (to make it comparable with the WTP, we will also divide the bid by the number of soil tests that the farmer wants to implement)
Sponsors
Name: Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt Location: Osnabrueck, Germany Url: https://www.dbu.de/

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