Concerns about rising prices may raise prices

How to cite

Petros, Fidel; Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo. 2023. "Concerns about rising prices may raise prices." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011745. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11745-3.0

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Fidel Petros* , Steffen Huck , Hans-Theo Normann

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011745
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11745-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-07-10 – 2024-01-06
Countries
Germany (Berlin)
JEL codes
C71, C92, D91, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11745

Abstract

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate whether statements from a governmental
institution expressing concerns about price increases trigger such increases by facilitating
tacit collusion. Such statements on market conduct are disclosed after an exogenous
and unexpected upward cost shock. The two potential channels affecting tacit collusion
work through (i) a reduction of strategic uncertainty and (ii) an inducement of
correlated beliefs. We find that issued statements of concern become a self-fulfilling
prophecy triggering price increases and that a reduction in strategic uncertainty drives
this adverse effect. Our results suggest that institutions should refrain from publishing
such statements of concern.

Intervention

Everything is in Hidden.

Experimental design

Everything is to be found in Hidden.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer in a lab
Randomization unit
matching group
Clusters
90 markets and 45 matching groups.
Observations
270 subjects
Arms
90 subjects per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Our focus is on the results of the 5th supergame (in the instructions, subjects see the 5th and the 6th cycle) where the intervention occurs during this supergame. Only the data of the 5th supergame is to interest for us. The first 4 supergames are to be considered as trial periods (in order that subjects gain experience in the game and in belief elicitation). EDIT: after discussion with many specialists, the 5th and the 6th cycle are equivalent to a 5th and 6th supergame, so that we run 6 supergame but without rematching between the 5th and the 6th since we want to observe the difference within markets. BELIEFS: individual belief about cooperation of firms' competitors just before and after the statement PRICES: individual prices just before and after the statement DEGREE OF PROFITABILITY: degree of profitability of a market just before and after the statement
Secondary outcomes
risk preferences, attitudes towards strategic uncertainty, other standard control variables.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords