We use a laboratory experiment to investigate whether statements from a governmental institution expressing concerns about price increases trigger such increases by facilitating tacit collusion. Such statements on market conduct are disclosed after an exogenous and unexpected upward cost shock. The two potential channels affecting tacit collusion work through (i) a reduction of strategic uncertainty and (ii) an inducement of correlated beliefs. We find that issued statements of concern become a self-fulfilling prophecy triggering price increases and that a reduction in strategic uncertainty drives this adverse effect. Our results suggest that institutions should refrain from publishing such statements of concern.
Intervention
Everything is in Hidden.
Experimental design
Everything is to be found in Hidden.
Design details
Randomization method
Computer in a lab
Randomization unit
matching group
Clusters
90 markets and 45 matching groups.
Observations
270 subjects
Arms
90 subjects per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Our focus is on the results of the 5th supergame (in the instructions, subjects see the 5th and the 6th cycle) where the intervention occurs during this supergame. Only the data of the 5th supergame is to interest for us. The first 4 supergames are to be considered as trial periods (in order that subjects gain experience in the game and in belief elicitation).
EDIT: after discussion with many specialists, the 5th and the 6th cycle are equivalent to a 5th and 6th supergame, so that we run 6 supergame but without rematching between the 5th and the 6th since we want to observe the difference within markets.
BELIEFS: individual belief about cooperation of firms' competitors just before and after the statement
PRICES: individual prices just before and after the statement
DEGREE OF PROFITABILITY: degree of profitability of a market just before and after the statement
Secondary outcomes
risk preferences, attitudes towards strategic uncertainty, other standard control variables.
Cited by
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