Returns to Price Transparency: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia
How to cite
Leon, Gianmarco; Deserranno, Erika; Kanz, Martin; Witoelar, Firman; Gottlieb, Daniel. 2023. "Returns to Price Transparency: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011715. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11715-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Despite the rapid expansion of branchless banking services across Indonesia over the past few years, there is an overarching concern that low client trust in digital financial services may be hampering demand and limiting financial inclusion. One of the main sources of mistrust in digital financial services is related to the lack of price transparency and the high prevalence of informal fees and illicit extra charges by agents to customers. To shed light on this issue, we partnered with one of Indonesia’s largest banks to (i) measure the consumer demand for price transparency and the extent of financial agent misconduct, and to (ii) estimate the market returns to price transparency. In our experiment, we will study the causal effect of providing clients with information about the bank’s official prices on take-up and usage of products, client perceptions, and agent responses following the diffusion of information about prices.
Intervention
The first part of the project aims at documenting the prevalence of informal fees and price discrimination in the market, as well as customer preferences for price transparency vis-à-vis other characteristics of the quality of services provided by the agent. To do this, we will conduct an on-line baseline survey with the agents’ customers.
Following the baseline survey, we will conduct an intervention in which the bank enforces price transparency by directly providing a random group of clients (stratified by agent) with the official prices for the main transaction services offered by branchless banking agents.
Approximately one month after the distribution of messages about the bank’s official prices, we will conduct an on-line endline survey to clients to learn about their perceptions and whether agents change their sales and price-setting strategy in response to the diffusion of information about the prices.
Experimental design
This transparency experiment is designed to estimate the effects of price transparency on customer behaviour, as well as the market returns to price transparency. For this, we will work with a random sample of agents working with our bank partner. Randomly selected clients of these agents will receive a WhatsApp message from the bank summarizing the official prices for the most common types of branchless banking transactions. The clients of the remaining agents will receive a placebo message that makes no mention of the bank’s official prices. Making use of the bank’s administrative data, we will be able to document the causal effects of price transparency on relevant outcome variables, such as take-up and usage of the products offered by agents. We will also be able to observe outcomes at the agent level, such as the balance in her account. We will complement these administrative data with information obtained from surveys with clients in which we will collect detailed information on the agent’s behaviour (transparency, sales strategies, etc.) and clients’ trust on the agent. This experiment will establish the extent to which branchless banking clients can use the information on actual prices for transactions to hold their agents accountable and, as a consequence, are more (or less) likely to use branchless banking products.
Design details
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