Price Transparency in the Branchless Banking Market: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia
How to cite
Leon, Gianmarco; Kanz, Martin; Deserranno, Erika; Witoelar, Firman; Gottlieb, Daniel. 2023. "Price Transparency in the Branchless Banking Market: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011714. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11714-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
To accelerate financial inclusion, in 2014 the Government of Indonesia adopted a law that establishes banking services without the need for branch offices: branchless banking agents. Since its launch, the number of agents has been increasing rapidly and they continue to play an important role in expanding financial services specifically to the country’s largely unbanked population. While the rapid expansion of branchless banking agents has made it possible for millions of Indonesians to have access to financial services, the market is often characterized by imperfect information about official transaction prices, overcharging, and customer mistrust. Economic theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effect of increased competition on market transparency. On the one hand, competition incentivizes agents to become more transparent in an effort to win their clients' trust and grow their business. On the other hand, competition makes financial agents more reluctant to be transparent to preserve market power and the ability to price discriminate. Working with one of the country’s largest banks, we conduct an experiment to test whether higher expected levels of competition lead to a higher willingness to disclose the bank’s official price list (price transparency), or alternatively, whether shrouding can be sustained at different levels of competition.
Intervention
The intervention will involve provision of information on the predicted level of future competition for branchless banking agents in a given location. This information will be presented during on-line survey to agents (right after the administration of baseline survey).
Experimental design
In our experiment, we will explore how an increase in expected competition affects the willingness to become more transparent. We will introduce experimental variation at the individual level in the expected level of competition by informing randomly selected agents in a treatment group about the predicted level of future competition in their local area. The remaining agents in the sample will be assigned to the control group and receive a placebo message that is orthogonal to the intervention.
The risk of spillovers is minimized by the fact that agents typically do not communicate with each other and the bank does not organize meetings or trainings where agents meet each other.
Design details
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