Price Transparency in the Branchless Banking Market: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia

How to cite

Leon, Gianmarco; Kanz, Martin; Deserranno, Erika; Witoelar, Firman; Gottlieb, Daniel. 2023. "Price Transparency in the Branchless Banking Market: Evidence from Branchless Banking Agents in Indonesia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011714. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11714-1.0

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Gianmarco Leon* , Martin Kanz , Erika Deserranno , Firman Witoelar , Daniel Gottlieb

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011714
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11714-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-07-10 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Indonesia (West Java)
JEL codes
D82, G28, G41, O14
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11714

Abstract

To accelerate financial inclusion, in 2014 the Government of Indonesia adopted a law that establishes banking services without the need for branch offices: branchless banking agents. Since its launch, the number of agents has been increasing rapidly and they continue to play an important role in expanding financial services specifically to the country’s largely unbanked population. While the rapid expansion of branchless banking agents has made it possible for millions of Indonesians to have access to financial services, the market is often characterized by imperfect information about official transaction prices, overcharging, and customer mistrust. Economic theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effect of increased competition on market transparency. On the one hand, competition incentivizes agents to become more transparent in an effort to win their clients' trust and grow their business. On the other hand, competition makes financial agents more reluctant to be transparent to preserve market power and the ability to price discriminate. Working with one of the country’s largest banks, we conduct an experiment to test whether higher expected levels of competition lead to a higher willingness to disclose the bank’s official price list (price transparency), or alternatively, whether shrouding can be sustained at different levels of competition.

Intervention

The intervention will involve provision of information on the predicted level of future competition for branchless banking agents in a given location. This information will be presented during on-line survey to agents (right after the administration of baseline survey).

Experimental design

In our experiment, we will explore how an increase in expected competition affects the willingness to become more transparent. We will introduce experimental variation at the individual level in the expected level of competition by informing randomly selected agents in a treatment group about the predicted level of future competition in their local area. The remaining agents in the sample will be assigned to the control group and receive a placebo message that is orthogonal to the intervention.
The risk of spillovers is minimized by the fact that agents typically do not communicate with each other and the bank does not organize meetings or trainings where agents meet each other.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be done through STATA.
Randomization unit
Individual agents.
Clusters
9,500 branchless banking agents (expected response rate: 25-30%)
Observations
9,500 branchless banking agents (expected response rate: 25-30%)
Arms
Control group: 4,000 agents Treatment group (high competition): 4,000 agents Treatment group (low competition): 1,500 agents
Primary outcomes
Our main outcome variable aims at measuring agents’ willingness to disclose information about the bank’s official prices to their customers.
Secondary outcomes
Using surveys with the agent’s clients, we will also be able to further confirm how the agent’s actions change after they have made their choices. In particular, the survey will include questions on whether the agent posts prices in her shop, and whether she forwarded the WhatsApp message to clients. We will additionally ask about the client’s trust in the agent and observe in the administrative data the frequency with which clients make transactions. Note, however, that this analysis will not be causal, given that perceptions will be influenced by the agent’s choice in the survey experiment, which in turn is determined by treatment assignment.
Sponsors
Name: The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab Southeast Asia’s Inclusive Financial Innovation Initiative Location: Indonesia Url: https://www.povertyactionlab.org/initiative/inclusive-financial-innovation-initiative Name: The Retail Finance Distribution (ReFinD) Initiative from Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic (ISSER) of the University of Ghana Location: Ghana Url: https://www.refind-isser.ug.edu.gh/

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Keywords