Selection and Incentive Effects of Financial and Career Incentives on Labor Productivity: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Malawi
How to cite
Kim, Hyuncheol; Kim, Thomas T.; Kim, Seonghoon. 2016. "Selection and Incentive Effects of Financial and Career Incentives on Labor Productivity: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Malawi." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001170. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1170-4.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study analyzes how financial and career incentive schemes affect labor productivity differently through worker selection and incentive channels. It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between work incentives and worker productivity because of the self-selection based on job seekers’ ability, expectation, personality, etc. We overcome this challenge through a two-stage randomized controlled trial in which our collaborating NGO recruits male enumerators for a population census of a rural district in Malawi. We make an important contribution to the literature by analyzing what types of workers internships attract (selection effect) and how they incentivize workers to improve their job performance (incentive effect).
Intervention
1) Financial Incentive, a fixed salary of 500 MWK a day (466 MWK = $1).
2) Career Incentives which consist of prospect of job opportunity at the collaborating NGO as a regular staff member and recommendation letter.
Experimental design
We implement a novel two-stage randomized controlled trial in the context of the recruitment, training, and survey processes of enumerators in collaboration with a local NGO in Malawi. In the first stage, 536 study subjects randomly receive one of the following three options: a job offer with a financial incentive (a one-time work opportunity with a daily market wage), a job offer with career incentives (a recommendation letter specifying job performance and a potential job opportunity at the collaborating NGO), and no job offer. In the second stage, for those who agree to work, we provide the same financial incentive to a randomly selected half of the career incentive group and the same career incentives to a randomly selected half of the financial incentive group. This two-stage randomization allows us to obtain two sub-groups with both financial and career incentives during enumeration work, with different channels of attraction to the job. Moreover, we can isolate the causal effects of career and financial incentives on labor productivity.
Design details
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