Why Don’t the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments

How to cite

Dupas, Pascaline; Robinson, Jonathan. 2016. "Why Don’t the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001169. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1169-1.0

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Pascaline Dupas* , Jonathan Robinson

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001169
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1169-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2008-05-01 – 2011-05-31
Countries
Kenya (Africa)
JEL codes
C93, D14, D91, I12, O12
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1169

Abstract

Using data from a field experiment in Kenya, we document that providing individuals with simple informal savings technologies can substantially increase investment in preventative health and reduce vulnerability to health shocks. Simply providing a safe place to keep money was sufficient to increase health savings by 66 percent. Adding an earmarking feature was only helpful when funds were put toward emergencies, or for individuals that are frequently taxed by friends and relatives. Group-based savings and credit schemes had very large effects.

Intervention

The trial uses a sample size of 113 ROSCAs (Rotating Savings and Credit Association), with an average of 17 members each, and assigns them to either a control group or one of four savings technologies. The savings technologies are:

1) Safe Box: a metal box with a key and slit on top. Participants were asked to save towards a specific health goal, but the participant had the key and was free to deposit and take out the money.

2) Lockbox: same as the Safe Box, but the key was with a program officer thus participants did not have access to the money. Once the saving goal was reached, the program officer would meet the participant and open the Lockbox at the shop where the product could be purchased.

3) Health Pot: Uses the same rotating savings structure of a ROSCA but created a side pot that the members contributed to in addition to the regular ROSCA pot. As with the regular pot, people contributed to the health pot at each meeting, the only difference being that this pot was earmarked for a specific health product. Although, the health product would be purchased individually, all members agreed to save towards the same product so that contribution amounts and cycle lengths did not vary across people.

4) Health Savings Account: Also uses the ROSCA structure where each member was encouraged to make regular deposits with the ROSCA treasurer. The funds deposited were earmarked for health. ROSCA treasurers were encouraged to not allow withdrawals unless the participant needed money for health expenditures.

Experimental design

Participants in both control and treatment ROSCAs were given information about preventative health products (such as bednets, water chlorination products, and ceramic water filters) and were encouraged to save toward investing in them. Since the control group was given the exact same information and encouragement as the treatment groups, any observed post-treatment differences in health investments across groups is interpreted as the impacts of the saving technologies introduced, rather than as differences in encouragement. For this reason, the comparison group should be thought of as an “Encouragement Group” rather than as a pure control which received no intervention whatsoever. In the four treatment groups, the savings devices were introduced and explained right after the encouragement was provided.

A random subset of ROSCA members was sampled for baseline data collection during the same meeting at which the encouragement and treatment offer (when applicable) were provided. Two follow-up surveys were conducted: a midline after six months and an endline after one year. Long term usage survey was conducted 33 months after intervention.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
ROSCA group.
Clusters
113 ROSCAs
Observations
833 ROSCA members
Arms
Control: 18 ROSCAs Treatment (Safe box): 20 ROSCAs Treatment (Lock box): 26 ROSCAs Treatment (Health Pot): 23 ROSCAs Treatment (Health Saving Account): 26 ROSCAs
Primary outcomes
(i) Take- up of savings technology (ii) Impact on health investment (iii) Long term usage and diffusion effects

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Dupas, Pascaline, and Jonathan Robinson. 2013. "Why Don’t the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments." American Economic Review 103(4): 1138-71. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/432_91%20Saving%20for%20Health%20with%20ROSCAS%20AER%202013.pdf

Cited by

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Keywords