Consent and Information Disclosure: An Experiment
How to cite
Nicholas, Aaron; Rai, Birendra; Chaudhury, Ratul. 2023. "Consent and Information Disclosure: An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011649. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11649-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Economic transactions may lead to disputes where the weaker party claims economic abuse or injury. A key consideration for whether policy or legislation should intervene is a lack of consent from the weaker party. An important element of consent is the information state of the weaker party at the time of transacting. With decreasing costs of information disclosure, this has led to governments, firms, and legislators inundating consumers with pre-transactional information (or mandating for it to be so). For example, mandatory disclosure "is among the most ubiquitous and least controversial elements of public policy, often promoted as an attractive alternative to so-called hard forms of regulation" (Loewenstein et al, 2014). The appeal of information disclosure stems from the general presumption that while more information may not necessarily help, it cannot make things worse for consumers. Motivated by literatures on blame, counterfactual thinking, and the psychology of consent, we explore avenues through which information disclosure may make things worse for the consumer. We consider how information disclosure affects both society (through third-party spectators) and the stronger party’s interpretations of the extent the consumer is believed to have consented to the outcomes, an issue that has received little scrutiny in the economics literature.
Intervention
We investigate:
(a) whether third-party spectators attach significance to “consumers” reading “contractual fine print”, even when such information is not pivotal to the consumer’s decision making.
(b) whether information disclosure provides a moral license to “firms” or instead encourages them to behave more fairly (a telltale heart effect [1]) when the firm is powerful and hence when information is not pivotal to the consumer’s decision making;
To investigate these questions, we adopt an online experiment via a Qualtrics survey distributed through Prolific. Our design involves a variant of the Yes/No version of the ultimatum game [2], where the first mover receives positive payoff even upon rejection. For question (a), we utilise the third-party spectators’ willingness to redistribute earnings in favour of the consumer in situations where the firm behaves opportunistically. For question (b), we utilise the firm’s offer to the consumer. We supplement this with elicitation of third-party spectators’ and firms’ interpretation of whether consumers consented to the exchange. This is incentivised using the Krupka and Weber [3] method.
References
[1] Loewenstein, G., Sunstein, C. R., & Golman, R. (2014). Disclosure: Psychology changes everything. Annu. Rev. Econ., 6(1), 391-419.
[2] Gehrig, T., Güth, W., Levati, V., Levínský, R., Ockenfels, A., Uske, T., & Weiland, T. (2007). Buying a pig in a poke. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(6), 692–703.
[3] Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A. (2013). Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary?. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3), 495-524.
Experimental design
Baseline (no information treatment)
• Pie size of 20
• Player A (PA) can offer 9 or 5 to PB and keep the remainder
• Player B (PB) can reject or accept without knowing the offer.
Rejection payoffs: (12 for PA, 0 for PB)
Acceptance payoffs: as per offer by PA
• If PA offered 5 and PB accepted, Player C (PC) is given a chance to decide the final payoffs for PA and PB. PC chooses one of the following three:
(15, 5); (11, 6); (9, 6)
PC is a spectator and their decision does not affect their own payoff.
• After these decisions, each player is given the same set of questions on Beliefs, Normative Expectations and demographic questionnaire. The Beliefs and Normative Expectations questions are incentivised. The latter is incentivised using the Krupka and Weber (2013) method.
• Normative Expectation questions related to consent will be used as a secondary outcome variable.
Information treatment
The only difference between the baseline and information treatment is that prior to deciding whether to accept or reject the offer, PB can choose to check or not check the offer by PA. To check, PB has to complete a decoding task that takes on average, 2-3 minutes of their time. If the task is completed, PB finds out what PA offered prior to deciding to reject or accept the offer. Otherwise, PB chooses as per the baseline treatment.
*Please refer to 'Experimental Design (Hidden)' for planned additions in May 2024
Design details
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