Discretion in Referrals: Evidence from a Tanzanian Export Garment Factory

How to cite

Ho, Yuen; Huang, Yihong. 2023. "Discretion in Referrals: Evidence from a Tanzanian Export Garment Factory." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011641. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11641-1.1

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Yuen Ho* , Yihong Huang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011641
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11641-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-06-22 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
O15, M51
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11641

Abstract

Developing country contexts are often characterized by informality and clientelism. In such contexts, can making processes more meritocratic improve efficiency? We study these questions with a field experiment in partnership with a large export garment manufacturing firm in Tanzania in the context of an on the job leadership training program offered by the firm. In the status quo system, supervisors and workers have a lot of discretion in who they informally recommend for professional opportunities. As in a classical principal-agent problem, on the one hand, such discretion can lead to more efficient outcomes if supervisors and workers have valuable private information not otherwise available to the firm. On the other hand, such discretion can reduce efficiency if supervisors and workers are biased, make mistakes, or have preferences that are not aligned with the firm’s objectives. To study whether discretion is efficient in this setting, we implement a two-part field experiment. First, we randomize whether supervisors and coworkers are informed of a performance–based referral bonus either before or after they recommend workers for the training program. If discretion is driven by taste-based preferences, or if incentives are misaligned between the firm and employees to begin with, then ex-ante bonus announcements should reduce inefficient discretion and result in higher quality referrals. If discretion is instead driven by genuine mistakes, statistical-based preferences, or if incentives are already aligned between the firm and employees, then ex-ante bonus announcements will have no effect or could even worsen the quality of referrals. To study the labor supply-side response to discretion, we also randomize whether applications to the training program emphasize that selection will be based on supervisor discretion (referrals) or objective, meritocratic measures (past performance records). Taken together, our study examines the efficiency of discretion in a labor context in which informal social relationships are paramount.

Intervention

Our partner firm is offering an on-the-job training program for promising workers, focusing on technical production, communication, leadership, and management skills. The program will be designed and implemented by our partner firm.

In a follow up phase of the project, our partner firm will be choosing workers to internally promote for a new facility they are opening. As part of the selection process, they will give a leadership test measuring a worker’s technical knowledge and leadership potential. Prior to the test, they will provide all workers with study materials with relevant information that will be tested. They will also ask supervisors to provide performance evaluations of workers, but as each supervisor supervises a large team and there is not enough time to evaluate all workers, in collaboration with the research team it will be randomly selected which workers are evaluated by their supervisors. Workers will be informed whether they were randomly selected for a performance evaluation and that if they were selected then the factory will assess their readiness for promotion by both their performance on the leadership test and their supervisor’s evaluation of their performance and that if they were not selected then the factory will assess their readiness for promotion by both their performance on the leadership test and their performance record.

Experimental design

Part 1 - Supervisor and coworker referrals: Supervisors and a random sample of workers will be given the opportunity to refer other workers for the training program. All supervisors and referring coworkers will receive a referral bonus if the worker(s) they recommend for the training successfully completes the training and scores within the top 50% of the training cohort in an assessment of their technical knowledge and soft skills. Prior to giving referrals, supervisors and referring coworkers will be randomized into one of two groups:
- Ex-ante bonus announcement: Respondents will be informed about the performance-based referral bonus prior to giving their referrals
- Ex-post bonus announcement: Respondents will be informed about the performance-based referral bonus after they have given their referrals

Part 2 - Worker applications: All eligible workers will be given the opportunity to apply for the training program. Specifically, by production teams, workers will be invited to an application session to learn about the training program and receive applications where they can indicate whether they want to apply to the training program or not. In these information sessions, workers will be randomly assigned to receive either one of two versions of the application form. The application forms are identical except for a difference of two words. Specifically, in the "Status Quo" version, the application form states that selection for the training program will be based on many criteria, including supervisor referrals. In the "Meritocratic" version, the application form states that selection for the training program will be based on many criteria, including past performance records.

In a follow up phase of the project, we will randomly select some workers to receive a performance evaluation from their supervisor. Analogously, we will inform workers whether they were randomly selected to receive a performance evaluation from their supervisor and, if they were selected for a performance evaluation, that the factory will assess their promotion readiness based on their performance on a leadership test and their supervisor’s evaluation of their performance; or, if they were not selected for a performance evaluation, that the factory will assess their promotion readiness based on their performance on a leadership test and their performance record.

Design details

Randomization method
For the referrals experiment, supervisors will be invited to attend a session for the referral process by facility. Within each facility meeting, supervisors will be randomized in person, into two groups, with assignments alternating consecutively based on the order in which supervisors are seated during the meeting. Within each facility, the referral process will then be conducted separately for each group, with one group receiving the ex-ante bonus announcement and the other group receiving the ex-post bonus announcement. The exact same randomization process will be used for the coworker referrals. For the application experiment, application forms will be pre-sorted in an alternating pattern (C/T/C/T/...etc) and handed out to workers consecutively based on how they are seated during the application information session for their production team. Both randomization methods are comparable to the randomization procedure used in Bursztyn and Jensen (2015). The randomization for the follow-up phase of the project will follow a similar randomization strategy to the one used for the referrals experiment. All workers will be invited to attend a lunch session, upon arrival they will be randomized into either group A or group B consecutively in the order that they arrive. One group will be randomly assigned to receive performance evaluations from their supervisors, while the other group will be randomly assigned to not receive performance evaluations from their supervisors.
Randomization unit
For all experimental parts, randomization is conducted at the individual level.
Clusters
Sample sizes: (1) Worker applications: 1,200 workers (2) Coworker referrals: 250 randomly selected workers (3) Supervisor referrals: 120 supervisors (4) Performance evaluations: 2,000 workers
Observations
(1) Worker applications: 1,200 workers (2) Coworker referrals: 250 randomly selected workers (3) Supervisor referrals: 120 supervisors (4) Performance evaluations: 2,000 workers
Arms
(1) Worker applications: 600 in the "Status Quo" form group; 600 in the "Meritocratic" form group (2) Coworker referrals: 125 in the "Ex Post Bonus" group; 125 in the "Ex Ante Bonus" group (3) Supervisor referrals: 60 in the "Ex Post Bonus" group; 60 in the "Ex Ante Bonus" group (4) Performance evaluations: 1,000 in the "no supervisor evaluation" group; 1,000 in the "supervisor evaluation group"
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variables of interest are the types and quality of the workers that apply and that are referred under the different referral experimental conditions, including gender, religion, past performance, and training assessment scores. In a follow up phase of the project, our key outcomes of interest will also include whether workers demand performance evaluation information, how much workers study for the leadership test (as measured by how many questions related to the study materials they answer correctly on the test), how well they perform on the leadership test, whether they chose to apply for promotion, and whether they invest in their own skills development (as measured by whether they choose to attend a voluntary training session).

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Keywords