Accident prevention and loss inflation in insurance: Theory and experiment
How to cite
Nguyen, Loan; Feess, Eberhard; Noy, Ilan. 2023. "Accident prevention and loss inflation in insurance: Theory and experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011628. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11628-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Many insurance policy holders inflate the size of their insured losses after events (claim-build up). Insurance companies develop sophisticated models for detecting insurance fraud and determining which insurance claims should be investigated. Based on a simple behavioral game theoretical model, we contribute to the literature by analyzing with an online experiment whether, and if so in which direction, the policy holders’ precaution measures are correlated with insurance fraud. Our model suggests that is ambiguous: People with high moral standards may invest and shy away from fraud, but policy holders who have invested may also feel more entitled to inflate their losses (see the literature on moral licensing and moral accounting).
Our experiment applies a 2x2 design with two variables: The first variable is whether the policy holder or a random computer draw decides on precaution in stage 1. We add the treatments with a random computer draw to remove self-selection into the treatments with and without moral accounting. The second variable in our 2x2 design is whether the instructions are framed in an insurance context or neutrally. In the neutral framing, we mention only amounts and probabilities, and avoid any reference to insurance. This allows us to analyze if the reference to insurance influences decisions, in particular by reducing moral concerns.
Experimental design
We inform participants that there are two parts and a survey, and that one of the parts will be chosen for determining the bonus (each with 50% probability). We also explain to them that we will provide the instructions for part 2 only after they have finished part 1.
In the first part, each subject is assigned to the active role of a policy holder (she). The insurer is a passive player, whose payoff depends on chance and the policy holder's behavior. The policy holder is asked for (a maximum of) two decisions: In the precaution stage 1, she decides on whether to invest part of her endowment to reduce the accident risk from 90% to 50%. Our design ensures that the policy holders' expected payoff is higher without investment, whereas the joint payoff of the policy holder and the insurer is higher with investment. It hence depends on the policy holder's other-regarding preferences if she invests or not. In case of no loss, the experiment ends. With loss, we proceed to the reporting stage 2. Policy holders can report their loss to the insurer honestly, or build it up in order to receive a higher compensation. They know that there is neither a risk of detection nor of punishment.
In part 2, each subject plays the role of the insurance company (passive player), and hence there is no decision to make. Subjects are randomly paired up and a random draw then decides which player’s decision as active player is relevant for both players’ payoffs. If subject A is chosen for part 1, then subject A gets the payoff depending on their decision in part 1, and subject B gets the payoff for the passive player, also depending on the decisions of player A in part 1 (and vice versa if subject B’s active role in part 1 is chosen for the payoffs).
We apply a 2x2 design with two variables: The first variable is whether the policy holder or a random computer draw decides on precaution in stage 1. We add the treatments with a random computer draw to remove self-selection into the treatments with and without moral accounting. Comparing the frequencies of inflated reports in stage 2 between the cases with and without investment hence allows us to isolate the entitlement effect of investment (though only for the case with random draws). The second variable in our 2x2 design is whether the instructions are framed in an insurance context or neutrally. In the neutral framing, we mention only amounts and probabilities, and avoid any reference to insurance. This allows us to analyze if the reference to insurance influences decisions, in particular by reducing moral concerns.
Design details
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