Reciprocal Prefernces in Non-Routine Work
How to cite
Opitz, Timm. 2023. "Reciprocal Prefernces in Non-Routine Work." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011617. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11617-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We often prefer to interact with individuals who also want to interact with us. Experimental evidence shows higher cooperation between partners who like to be matched with each other. In a stylized Public Goods Game setting, participants expect those who want to be matched with you to be more cooperative, and you act more altruistically yourself (Opitz and Schwaiger, 2022). At the same time, it remains unclear whether such preferences impact behavior in collaborative teamwork. Therefore, I investigate how knowing your partner's preferences about you affects (non-routine) teamwork.
Experimental design
The experiment crucially consists of a team-formation process and a non-routine team task that participants perform within the formed dyads. Preferences over team partners are submitted to a (two-sided) strategy-proof mechanism. The underlying preferences of players are based on self-reported questionnaire information of the potential partners. While the ranking refers to a payoff-irrelevant interaction task, the incentivized non-routine task is played with a randomly matched partner. I compare behavior under two information structures in a between-subject design. In the baseline condition , participants never know their partner ranks them. In the treatment condition, participants do receive the information before the non-routine team task. This allows them to incorporate this information into their behavior in the joint team task.
Design details
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