In this experiment, we examine the conditions under which individuals consider the exploitation of loopholes acceptable. The experiment involves two types of participants: workers and spectators. Workers are matched into groups of four and are supposed to pay a tax designed to equalize their incomes. However, they have the option to work on a calculation task to reduce their tax rate at the expense of other participants. The calculation task contains a loophole, which allows workers to strongly lower their tax rate. Spectators judge whether exploiting the loophole is appropriate or not. They can decide whether to close the loophole in future sessions or whether to sanction workers who exploited the loophole. In separate treatments, we vary whether pre-tax incomes reflect earned merits, how difficult it is to detect the loophole, and the efficiency costs of redistribution.
We target 600 spectators and 80 workers per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Share of spectators that close the loophole: Spectators are matched with a group of workers from a future session and can decide whether the loophole should be closed for these subjects.
Appropriateness of using the loophole: Spectators’ first-order and second-order beliefs of the appropriateness of exploiting the loophole.
Share of spectators that sanction loophole exploiters: Spectators are matched with a group of workers from a previous session and can decide whether loophole exploiters should be sanctioned.
Secondary outcomes
Appropriateness of tax adjustment: Spectators’ first-order and second-order beliefs of the appropriateness of participating in the fraction task in general.
Appropriateness of ex-post sanctioning: Spectators’ first-order and second-order beliefs of the appropriateness of sanctioning a loophole exploiter ex-post.
As manipulation checks, we estimate treatment effects on factors related to the treatments. These include participant perceptions regarding the deservedness of gross incomes in the experiment, whether they successfully detected the loophole and their estimations of how many others they believe did, their views on whether individuals who exploit the loophole are clever, and their opinions on whether the tax revenues are being wasted.
We will investigate mechanisms explaining the decision to close or sanction the loophole using the factors above, as well as the belief of how many subjects exploit the loophole and by how much.
Exploratively, we will investigate whether behavior in the experiment is correlated with political views and voting behavior in previous presidential elections. We will also investigate the relationship with their beliefs regarding the appropriateness of loopholes, preferences for redistribution, and perceptions of the efficiency of public spending.
Exploratively, we will also investigate the behavior of the workers. Here, we focus on their choice to use the loophole and on whether they consider using the loophole appropriate.
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