Outcome bias: Information complexity and domain specificity

How to cite

Brownback, Andy. 2023. "Outcome bias: Information complexity and domain specificity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011607. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11607-2.0

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Andy Brownback*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011607
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11607-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-09-05 – 2023-12-31
Countries
United States of America (Arkansas)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11607

Abstract

This project explores a principal-agent setting where the agent can exert costly effort to improve the likelihood of success for the principal. The principal then has the opportunity to punish the agent. The agent cannot, however, guarantee the outcome for the principal. There are always states of the world outside of the agent's control where the principal wins or loses regardless of the agent's effort level. Under two different treatments, these states of the world are presented in different ways. This project measures the effect of their presentation on effort and punishment. This project also measures how outcomes in the principal-agent interaction affect perceptions of agents in other domains.

Intervention

Principals and agents will interact under two treatments that affect the presentation of which states of the world the agent controls and which the agent does not. Principals' perceptions of agents across other domains will then be collected.

July 2025 addition:

Third parties will repeat the procedures of the principals in eliciting perceptions of agents.

Experimental design

Principals and agents will interact under two treatments that affect the presentation of which states of the world the agent controls and which the agent does not. Principals' perceptions of agents across other domains will then be collected.

July 2025 addition:

Third party perceptions of agents across the same domains will also be collected.

Design details

Randomization method
Principals and agents will be assigned to one information condition randomly with a 50% chance determined by the computer. They will stay in this condition throughout the study. In each interaction, the agent's cost per number will vary randomly (again determined by the computer) within a 3-cent band around $0.25 (we will use this variation to estimate the local demand curve). Next, within each interaction, the outcome of the principal will be (partly) randomly determined by the roll of the dice, which will be simulated by the computer. Finally, each elicitation will feature randomly-selected observations of one round of different agents. Principals will only ever observe agents who are assigned to the same information treatment (Combined or Separated). But, otherwise, the computer will make these selections entirely at random among all rounds of all agents in the study session. July 2025 addition: Each elicitation from the third party will feature randomly-selected observations of one round of different agents. Third parties will only ever observe agents who are assigned to the same information treatment (Combined or Separated). But, otherwise, the computer will make these selections entirely at random among all rounds of all agents in the study session.
Randomization unit
Each individual will experience the information randomization once. However, they will experience the cost randomization, the dice randomization, and the agent-selection randomization each round.
Clusters
160 subjects: 80 principals and 80 agents 40 subjects per role and information treatment July 2025 addition: 240 subjects: all third parties 120 subjects per information treatment
Observations
10 punishment decisions per principal --> 800 punishment decisions, 400 per information treatment 20 dictator choices and real-effort delegate choices per principal --> 1600 dictator and delegate choices, 800 per information treatment 5 guesses about average effort and guesses about demographics --> 400 guesses, 200 per treatment July 2025 addition: 240 subjects: all third parties 120 subjects per information treatment 40 dictator choices and real-effort delegate choices per principal --> 9600 dictator and delegate choices, 4800 per information treatment 10 guesses about average effort and guesses about demographics --> 2400 guesses, 1200 per treatment
Arms
160 subjects: 80 principals and 80 agents 40 subjects per role and information treatment July 2025 addition: 240 subjects: all third parties 120 subjects per information treatment
Primary outcomes
For the first area of exploration, the key outcomes we will measure are: Investment by the agent under different information regimes. Punishment (in general) by the principal under different information regimes. How each information regime affects the following: How sensitive the principal's punishment choice is to the agent's effort. I will regress punishment on effort. How sensitive the principal's punishment choice is to their outcome (win or lose). I will regress punishment on outcome after controlling for effort. How sensitive the principal's punishment choice is to their outcome when that outcome is within the agent's control. I will regress punishment on outcome interacted with whether the region is within the agent's control after controlling for effort and whether the region is within the agent's control. How sensitive the principal's punishment choice is to their outcome when that outcome is outside of the agent's control. I will regress punishment on outcome interacted with whether the region is within the agent's control and whether the principal was assigned to the Split Information treatment after controlling for effort, whether the region is within the agent's control, the information treatment, and the interactions of these control variables. For the second area of exploration, the key outcomes we will measure are: How an agent's effort affects the likelihood that a principal will select them to be a dictator in a subsequent dictator game. How an agent's effort affects the likelihood that a principal will select them to perform a real-effort task on their behalf in a subsequent game. For the second area of exploration, the key outcomes will be the perceptions of the principal that we elicit in each of four domains: First, the principals will guess the average effort that the agent invested across all rounds. Their reward will increase as their guesses are more accurate. I will regress the principal's guess on the outcome observed after controlling for the effort observed. Second, the principals will select an agent to play the role of dictator in a dictator game. The selected dictator will determine any additional payments given to the principal. I will regress the principal's selection of dictator on the outcome observed after controlling for the effort observed. NOTE: variables will be standardized within the set of dictators a principal observes since they must make a selection from a set of four possible dictators Third, the principals will select an agent to perform a real-effort task on their behalf. The principal will receive greater earnings if the selected agent performs the real-effort task accurately. I will regress the principal's selection of agent for the real-effort task on the outcome observed after controlling for the effort observed. NOTE: variables will be standardized within the set of dictators a principal observes since they must make a selection from a set of four possible dictators Fourth, the principals will guess demographic characteristics of the agents. They will be paid for their accuracy. I will regress the principal's guesses about demographic information on the outcome observed and on the effort observed to measure stereotyping in both dimensions. July 2025 addition: To supplement the primary data collection between the counterparties (Principals and Agents), I will elicit behavior from third parties who are replicating the procedures of the second area of exploration. These third parties will feature identical key outcomes: How an agent's effort affects the likelihood that the third party will select them to be a dictator in a subsequent dictator game. How an agent's effort affects the likelihood that the third party will select them to perform a real-effort task on their behalf in a subsequent game. For this replication/expansion, the key outcomes will be the perceptions of the third parties that we elicit in each of four identical domains. Like principals, third parties will either be assigned to observe information in a combined or split information treatment. The information treatment will be a key source of heterogeneity. First, the third parties will guess the average effort that the agent invested across all rounds. Their reward will increase as their guesses are more accurate. I will regress the guess on the outcome observed after controlling for the effort observed (heterogeneity by information presentation). Second, the third parties will select an agent to play the role of dictator in a dictator game. The selected dictator will determine any additional payments given to the third parties. I will regress the third parties' selection of dictator on the outcome observed after controlling for the effort observed (heterogeneity by information presentation). NOTE: variables will be standardized within the set of dictators a third party observes since they must make a selection from a set of four possible dictators Third, the third parties will select an agent to perform a real-effort task on their behalf. The third party will receive greater earnings if the selected agent performs the real-effort task accurately. I will regress the third parties' selection of agent for the real-effort task on the outcome observed after controlling for the effort observed (heterogeneity by information presentation). NOTE: variables will be standardized within the set of dictators a third party observes since they must make a selection from a set of four possible dictators Fourth, the third parties will guess demographic characteristics of the agents. They will be paid for their accuracy. I will regress the third parties' guesses about demographic information on the outcome observed and on the effort observed to measure stereotyping in both dimensions (heterogeneity by information presentation).

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