Relational Mobility Leads to Altruism

How to cite

Lu, Ziqi. 2023. "Relational Mobility Leads to Altruism." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011553. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11553-1.0

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Ziqi Lu*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011553
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11553-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-07-17 – 2023-07-21
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C72, Z10, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11553

Abstract

Do relational mobility affect people's degree of altruism in prisoner's dilemma? In this study, subjects are matched in pairs to play repeated prisoner's dilemma, and some subjects are allowed to change partners (i.e. they are relationally mobile). The study aims to investigate whether mobile players more altruistic or less, and how much of people's altruism can be attributed to mobility as opposed to other factors.

In terms of data collection, I will send out surveys to ask for people's game strategies, and subjects will be informed whether they have relational mobility or not prior to specifying their strategies. I will then collect their strategies, pay the subjects by the amount of money their strategies generate, and look at how different game conditions change the strategies submitted by the subjects.

Intervention

Subjects are asked to provide their strategies in a pairwise 2-period non-cooperative game. The treated subjects will have an option to change the partner they are playing with after the first period, while the controls have to play with the same partners for both periods.

Experimental design

Subjects are asked to provide their strategies in a pairwise 2-period gift-exchange game. In each of the two periods, both players will simultaneously and unconditionally give 0 to 100 points to her partner, and the experimenter adds 50% to it. At the end of Round 1, the treated subjects will have an option to leave the partner they are playing with by indicating a threshold of points: if their partners give less than the threshold, they will switch partners, and each of them will be assigned a random new partner. The controls have to play with the same partners for both periods.

Each subject is also asked about how much she expects her partner to give her.

The key hypothesis is that subjects in the treatment group (with mobility) give more in round 1 than subjects in the control group (without mobility).

Design details

Randomization method
Computer randomization
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
2,000 individuals
Observations
2,400 individuals
Arms
1,200 individuals control 1,200 individuals treatment
Primary outcomes
Number of points each player gave out at the beginning.
Secondary outcomes
1. The number of points given at round 2. 2. The number of points below which players would switch partners.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords