Authoritarian Preferences

How to cite

Dogan, Gonul; Strang, Louis. 2023. "Authoritarian Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011551. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11551-3.1

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Gonul Dogan* , Louis Strang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011551
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11551-3.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-06-20 – 2025-05-01
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D01, D31, D72, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11551

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory and online experiment to investigate the causal effect of the threat to the majority group's power on preferences for authoritarian decision-making.

Intervention

In the main experiment, participants read news articles (Part 1 of the experiment) and are subsequently matched to four groups with different compositions of members of majority and minority. We define minority as those individuals with a name most ethnic Germans would identify belonging to Muslims, namely but not exclusively, Turkish, Arabic, Persian or some names originating from the Balkans. We define majority as individuals with an ethnic German name. The four groups vary in their composition comprising 0, 1, 4, or 9 minority members out of 10 group members. The group members will have their first name displayed during the main experiment. See below for the construction of the reference sample.
Participants in the main experiment will distribute money between themselves and each of these groups separately (Part 2 of the experiment). They will subsequently state their preference for decision-making rules that determine the distribution of money (Part 3 of the experiment).
Our main treatment variation is the type of news articles participants read before they make distribution decisions. They will either read 10 neutral news items without person identifiers or 10 articles that constitute a power threat. Our main power threat treatment comprises news articles of success stories of minority members. Each of these articles provide information about one minority group member living in Germany who either set up a successful firm or made important societal contributions. In a second power threat treatment, we introduce ethnic German success stories. Articles are balanced with respect to gender with 5 female success stories and 5 male success stories. Neutral news articles are constructed on the basis of power threat articles. Here, individuals’ information is replaced with sectoral information or a focus on the innovation itself (if relevant).
Participants receive a fixed payoff for their participation. Their allocation decisions are incentivized as follows: At the end of the experiment, one participant and one allocation part is chosen per treatment for additional payment. Part 2 is chosen with 90 percent probability and Part 3 with 10 percent probability. With Part 2 being chosen, one of the groups is further with equal probability randomly chosen, and the participant’s allocation decision when facing that group determines his own additional payoff as well as the additional payoff of that group’s members. If Part 3 is chosen, the participant’s choices determine the decision-making rule that decides on the allocation of payoffs across the four groups. The participant here is making a decision behind the veil of ignorance, and thus, his or her payoff is equal to one randomly selected person out of the four groups.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of four parts.
Part 1 consists of reading 10 news articles.
In Part 2, participants are matched with four groups, and each group separately. They are provided the first names of group members in each group. When facing each group, they decide how to allocate 330 euro across themselves and group members.
In Part 3, participants are informed that the members of the reference sample made decisions under three different decision rules. For all decision rules, each member of the four groups made an allocation decision for members of the four groups –including herself– separately.
- Decision rule 1: majority rule
- Decision rule 2: one group rule
- Decision rule 3: one person rule
Next, participants are asked how much they prefer each of the three rules.
In Part 4, participants fill in
1. Discrete emotions questionnaire (Harmon-Jones, Bastian, and Harmon-Jones 2016),
2. Their demographics: their place of birth, gender, age, the state they live in, monthly net household income, marital status, number of children, where their parents are born, highest education level achieved, their employment status,
3. Political and religious identification: political position (left and right), the party they would vote for if elections were to be held this weekend, whether they voted in the last federal elections, religion
4. Power threat: how much they agree that powerful positions both politically or in leading firms should be occupied by different types of groups, and how much they think the government should take into account the ethnic or religious background on those living in Germany.
5. Authoritarianism measure questions based on Altemeyer (1998), Costello et al. (2020) and MacWilliams (2016).
6. Social dominance orientation, the short version based on Ho et al. (2015).
7. Support for immigration, support for redistribution, attitudes towards immigrants and beliefs about immigrants’ poverty and unemployment based on Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva (2022).

The reference sample is constructed via a laboratory experiment.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer randomisation
Randomization unit
Experimental session
Clusters
First data collection: 400 Second data collection: 200 participants Third data collection: 990 participants
Observations
1590
Arms
600 control (about 300 in West and East Germany each), 600 power threat-minority (about 300 in West and East Germany), and 390 power threat-majority from East Germany.
Primary outcomes
The main outcome variables comprise the allocation decisions in Part 2 and Part 3. In Part 2, the outcome variable is the amount of money allocated to individuals based on their minority or majority membership. The main outcome variable from Part 3 is the points allocated to authoritarian decision-making rules, decision rules 2 and 3. Further outcome variables are the points allocated to groups and individuals per group membership in decision rules 2 and 3, respectively. Primary outcome variables will further be separately analysed based on whether participants are from former West or East Germany.
Secondary outcomes
Emotions, authoritarianism measures, attitudes towards migration and the measure of power threat we employ. We will aggregate the answers to these measures and conduct separate analyses on them. Exploratory analysis: Prior authoritarianism measures and social dominance orientation.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords