Social learning: the Role of Organizational Prestige and Incentives
How to cite
Macera, Rosario; Poblete, Joaquin; Brahm, Francisco. 2023. "Social learning: the Role of Organizational Prestige and Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011534. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11534-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study the role of organizational prestige in fostering workers' learning. In a field study, we hire around 400/600 workers who are alumni or students of different high-education institutions to evaluate the performance of seller executives. In an online evaluation platform, workers listen to executives' recorded conversations to predict the executive's success rate. To test for the role of organizational prestige in learning, we measure how workers' predictions change as they are informed about predictions of other people who belong to their own, a higher, and lower prestige institution. In the control, workers are informed of an average prediction without referencing any institution. To test for the moderating effect of incentives, we randomize a small monetary bonus for the prediction accuracy across the prestige treatments.
Intervention
We hire workers to evaluate the performance of seller executives from a charity institution in Chile. In an online platform, workers listen to audio files of conversations between executives and pedestrians. Then, they answer 18 questions about the executives’ subjective ability to persuade the pedestrian to become a permanent donor. Once they answer the questionary, workers predict the overall success rate of the executive by guessing how many pedestrians---out of 100---they think the executive would be able to persuade (the “prediction” question). Workers are paid a fixed wage of $ 20,000CLP to evaluate audio files for four hours. This is the market wage for a half-day blue-collar type job in Chile. All workers are alumni or current students of high-education institutions in Chile.
In a within-subjects design, we inform subjects at the audio level about the average prediction of people from several high-education institutions of varying prestige. Workers start the job evaluating six audios to get familiar with the questionnaire. In the following four audios (“treatment audios”), after subjects have answered the prediction question, they receive a message delivering the average prediction of people from a top-prestige institution (“High-prestige” treatment), a low-prestige institution (“Low-prestige” treatment), their own institution (“Belonging” treatment), and a message with an average prediction but no institution (“No institution” control). Then, the platform offers them the possibility to reconsider their prediction and answer the prediction question again. The four messages are randomly assigned to the four audios. The order of the four treatment audios is also randomized.
To study whether incentives moderate prestige-induced learning, we also randomize a small monetary bonus for accuracy in their prediction. In two of the four treated audios, workers can earn $1.000 CLP (around 1.2 US dollars) if their prediction matches the actual success rate of the executive in the audio and $500 CLP if their prediction is three percentage points above or below the truth. The incentive is randomized either in the first and third audio/message or the second and fourth.
Experimental design
(1) Workers’ recruitment
The job add is advertised in online job boards and social media pages advertising part-time jobs (Facebook and Instagram). All applicants who are older than 18, have a computer with internet connection, are Spanish native speakers, and have (at some point) studied in a high-education institution (university of vocational institutions (IPs and CFTs in Chile)) are eligible.. Since payment is processed through a wire transfer, we also request workers to have an account at a bank operating in Chile.
(2) The job
Workers are hired to evaluate audio files containing the executives-pedestrian conversations during 4 hours. The job takes place completely online, in an evaluation platform programmed in Qualtrics for the purpose of this study.
After listening to a given audio, workers answer 18 questions related to the executive performance (for instance, whether the executive delivered information about the charity programs, the emotions they were able to generate, etc.) For this study, the relevant question is the previous to last, where workers are asked to make a prediction about the executive’s future success rate:
“Finally, if this [executive] were to talk to 100 more [clients], how many of those 100 do you think she/he would be able to convince to become members? (That is, to deliver a monthly contribution)”
Randomization of the information and incentives occur in this question.
(3) Treatments and radomization
Treatments take place in a within-subject design. Randomization, therefore, takes place at the audio level.
Workers evaluate three blocks of audios. The first block contains six fixed audios that serve as practice. The third and final block has random audio until the 4 hours of word elapse.
Randomization occurs in the second block of audios containing four fixed audios, equal for all participants. In these four audio files, we randomize four messages informing the worker about the average prediction of people from other high-education institutions: a top-prestige institution (“High-prestige” treatment), a low-prestige institution (“Low-prestige” treatment), their own institution (“Belonging” treatment) and a message with an average prediction but no institution (Control).
To study how incentives affect prestige-induced learning, we also randomize a monetary bonus for accuracy in their prediction. In two of the four treated audios, workers can earn $1.000 CLP (around 1.2 US dollars) if their prediction matches the real success rate of the executive in the audio, and $500 CLP if their prediction is three percentage points above or below the truth. The incentive is randomized either in the first and third audio/message or in the second and fourth. As a reference of the power of the incentive, the overall fixed payment for evaluating audios for 4.5 hours is $20.000 CLP.
In the four treated audio files, subjects make an initial prediction without seeing the message, then they see the message/incentive and are asked to re-evaluate their answer. Messages are randomly assigned to audios. The order of the audios is also randomized. To avoid confounding learning with accuracy, reference institutions in the high, low, and control treatments have the same average prediction across the four audios so that predictions are, on average, equally accurate.
Design details
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