Improving Teaching and Learning for Disadvantaged Students in Diverse Classrooms: Experiments on Teacher Incentives in Uganda
How to cite
Lucas, Adrienne; Kasiyre, Ibrahim; Karachiwalla, Naureen; Gilligan, Daniel; Neal, Derek. 2016. "Improving Teaching and Learning for Disadvantaged Students in Diverse Classrooms: Experiments on Teacher Incentives in Uganda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001152. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1152-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The study implements the Pay for Percentile (PFP) incentive system for primary class 6 (P6) math teachers in 151 government schools in rural Uganda. The intervention is designed to address two issues. First, teacher attendance and effort appear to be weak in many rural schools. Second, because the results of P7 leaving exams are publicized widely, schools face clear incentives to encourage weak P6 students to drop out. By comparing distributions of outcomes in the 151 treatment schools with outcomes in 151 control schools, we seek to determine whether PFP is an effective tool for improving teacher effort in ways that raise student achievement and mitigate educational triage.
Intervention
We treat 151 P6 Math teachers with a variant of (PFP) that pays per-student bonuses. We place teachers in leagues based on approximate class size. We place students in leagues based on the results of a baseline test that we administer before we inform treatment teacher's about the program. We conduct follow up testing at the end of the school year.
Experimental design
In late March and early April of 2016, near the start of the Ugandan school year, we will visit 302 government primary schools in rural Uganda. In all schools, we will administer a math test to P6 students that will cover material in the Ugandan math curriculum from levels P1 through P6. We will interview P6 students, the P6 math teacher, and the head teacher in each school.
In late October and November of 2016, near the end of the Ugandan school year, we will return to administer another test to the same students. The test will cover the same material, but we will not repeat any questions.
We will also administer the student, P6 teacher, and head teacher questionnaires again, possibly with additional items.
In 151 of the sample schools, the P6 math teacher will receive an incentive treatment. The incentive scheme is the Pay for Percentile (PFP) system described in Barlevy and Neal (2012). All students on the register, both those present and absent during the two days of testing, will affect the bonuses that treatment teachers earn.
PFP is an optimal mechanism from the standpoint of students. Thus, it does not contain any incentives for educational triage. The performance of each student contributes to a given teacher's bonus payment in a manner that should induce the teacher to increase effort directed to each of her students.
Teachers in control schools face clear incentives inherent in the Ugandan education system to direct their attention primarily to their best students. Primary schools in Uganda include seven levels, P1-P7. At each school, results on the primary leaving exam (PLE) at the end of P7 attract significant attention (and sanctions) from public officials and local residents, with particular focus on the number of students who score poorly. Therefore, many schools begin urging weaker students to leave school in P6. If weak students never enter P7, they will never take the PLE. Thus, they will never receive weak PLE marks, and their schools will report better PLE results.
Design details
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