The Design of Social Protection for the Poor: Asset for Cash Transfers
How to cite
Rasul, Imran; Khan, Adnan. 2023. "The Design of Social Protection for the Poor: Asset for Cash Transfers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011512. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11512-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project studies social protection programs for the poor: we ask whether in-kind transfers are more effective at tackling household poverty than offering households with the equivalent valued transfer as an unconditional cash transfer (UCT)?
We use an RCT to measure the causal impact on households of the offer of either in-kind asset transfer or unconditional cash transfer. We estimate the impacts of each form of transfer on a rich set of economic, social and psychological outcomes at the individual and household. We measure impacts both on the actual beneficiary households, and also measure whether there are positive or negative spillover effects of each form of social protection scheme to other households in the same community.
Intervention
The anti-poverty interventions we study take two forms. The first offered poor households productive assets in-kind. To determine the menu of assets to offer, in each village we first conducted an assessment of those assets most likely to provide high market returns. The menu of assets offered typically covered livestock, those enabling households to start a small retail business (e.g. grocery shop, fruit stall), crop farming, and other forms of self-employment (e.g. tailoring). In conjunction with these in-kind asset transfers, households were also offered training. Each training course divided into two parts: the first provided general training on establishing and running small-scale enterprises, and the second provided technical training specific to the chosen asset(s). The value of training was fixed at PKR12K. Hence the total value of transfers and training offered was PKR62K (around 620USD). We refer to this as treatment T1.
The second intervention is identical to the first but with one more listed option on the menu: to take an one-off unconditional cash transfer of PKR62K. To mimic the timing of transfers and training in T1, the delivery of cash transfers was staggered as an up-front payment of PKR50K followed by PKR12K a month later. We refer to this as treatment T2.
Experimental design
Our evaluation follows a two-stage randomization design. In the first, we randomly assign villages to T1, T2 or control. Randomization is stratified by district. At a second stage, within treated villages, we randomly assign the actual offer of treatment among eligible households. Half of those eligible are actually offered treatment. Among the poor in treated villages, we thus distinguish between the treated poor (TP) and the not treated poor (NTP).
Design details
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