Fairness preferences when facing limited information

How to cite

Cappelen, Alexander; Tungodden, Bertil; Haan, Thomas de; Bonn, Caroline. 2016. "Fairness preferences when facing limited information." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001151. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1151-1.0

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Alexander Cappelen* , Bertil Tungodden , Thomas de Haan , Caroline Bonn

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001151
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1151-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2016-04-04 – 2017-04-04
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1151

Abstract

Recent experimental studies show that behavior in distributional situations can be traced back to a variety of fairness ideals and that the majority of people can be characterized as meritocrats distinguishing between personal factors (effort and talent) and impersonal factors (luck) when it comes to the attribution of responsibility for an outcome. However, in many situations the extend to which an achievement is determined by an individual's performance or luck is not directly observable and often remains unknown. In this project, we therefore aim to answer the following research question: What happens to people's willingness to redistribute earnings if there exists uncertainty about the role of luck and merit in the production of these earnings?

Experimental design

The experiment has two parts. In the first part, the production phase, the workers perform a real-effort task to earn points. Each worker's production depends both on the worker's performance in the real-effort task as well as a random factor that cannot be in influenced by the
worker. In the second part, the distribution phase, two workers will be randomly matched and it will be determined how the sum of their production - their total production - is divided between them. In our study we focus both on distribution decisions by one of the workers, being a 'stakeholder', as well as distribution decisions made by an impartial third party, the 'spectator'.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
No clusters
Observations
450 individuals
Arms
Between 110 and 115 individuals in each of the four treatments arms.
Primary outcomes
In all situations two workers have earned money by conducting a real effort task. The main dependent variable is how the participants choose to distribute the production value between two workers. Subsidiary we study the beliefs about other participants performance.

Cited by

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Keywords