Determinants of gang entry

How to cite

Blattman, Christopher; Tobon, Santiago; Rodriguez-Uribe, Arantxa. 2023. "Determinants of gang entry." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011490. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11490-1.3

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Christopher Blattman* , Santiago Tobon , Arantxa Rodriguez-Uribe

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011490
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11490-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-05-12 – 2024-05-17
Countries
Colombia (Medellin)
JEL codes
K42, I26, J13, J24
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11490

Abstract

In poor neighborhoods across Latin America, one of the largest social organizations is the street gang. They are often the largest employer in the neighborhood, especially of poor adolescent boys. It’s striking, then, how little we understand these firms and, most importantly, the decision-making process of young recruits. Medellin, Colombia, has hundreds of well-organized street gangs. We have partnered with the Secretariat of Education to conduct a population-based survey of two cohorts of grade 7 boys. We intend to conduct the surveys in roughly half of Medellin’s 200 public schools, and anticipate that roughly 10,000 boys will participate. In addition to measuring a variety of risk factors and preferences, the survey measures boys’ expectations of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to various careers: low-skill, medium-skill, high-skill, and gang/criminal careers. It also assesses boys’ self-reported interest in each career and the career interests of their friends. Finally, the survey incorporates a series of information experiments to test whether it is possible to correct any misperceptions associated with gang entry. We used a first wave of roughly 1,200 surveys to identify likely misperceptions and pilot information experiments. These will be tested in the remaining to-be-surveyed sample. Experiment 1 targets the perceived returns to medium- and high- skill careers. Experiment 2 targets the perceived non-pecuniary returns to criminal/gang careers (status and enjoyability). We are interested in how these information treatments affect posterior beliefs, career interest in the gang, and interest in and take-up of information on non-criminal careers.

Note that this experimental design was updated in September 2023 to reflect the second information experiment launched in the same month.

Intervention

Experiment 1: Treated subjects receive information on expected earning potential among three groups: those who do not complete high school; those who complete high school; and those who complete tertiary education. Half of the treated subjects receive the information in the form of statistics and graphical figures. Half of the treated subjects receive the information in the form of a story about three friends who took different educational and career paths.

Experiment 2: Treated subjects watch a video featuring three actors who provide dialogue directly taken from interviews with current and former gang members. The selected dialogue emphasizes how they had high expectations of enjoyment and status from gang careers but how in the end status and enjoyability were low and friend, family and community relations were difficult.

Note that this experimental design was updated in September 2023 to reflect the second information experiment launched in the same month.

Experiment 3: (On hold). We originally envisioned a third experiment where treated subjects receive information designed to change beliefs about the probability of arrest, incarceration, and death in gang and criminal careers. This is on hold, in the event that the sample size of surveys can be expanded.

Experimental design

Experiment 1:

We expect treatment effects on our primary outcomes to be concentrated among high-risk pupils, and among pupils who underestimate the returns to high-school completion and higher education. We expect our primary outcome regression to take the following form:

Y = b1 T + b2 T*L + b3 T*E + b4 T*L*E + b5 L + b6 E + b7 X + S + e

where
Y is our primary outcome
T is assignment to the information treatment
L is an indicator for low risk (the number of friends interested in the gang career, using the same threshold as Y)
E is a measure of erroneous prior beliefs, centered at zero, where positive values imply overestimating returns to legal careers
X is a set of pre-information experiment control variables taken from survey and administrative data, selected using the double lasso method on primary outcomes
S is a set of school fixed effects
e is an error term (not clustered)

We expect b1 to be positive when the outcome is legal income, and negative when the outcome is gang interest. We also expect the effects to be larger for youth with priors that overestimate legal incomes, and so we are also interested in b3.

Experiment 2:

Experiment 2 began in September 2023 at the time of this update.

As with experiment 1, we expect treatment effects on our primary outcomes to be concentrated among high-risk pupils. In this case, also among pupils with high expectations of non-pecuniary returns to criminal/gang careers, such as status and enjoyability. We expect our primary outcome regression to take the following form:

Y = a1 T + a2 T*L + a3 T*E + a4 T*L*E + a5 L + a6 E + a7 X + S + e

where
Y is our primary outcome
T is assignment to the information treatment
L is an indicator for low risk (the number of friends interested in the gang career, using the same threshold as Y)
E is a measure of expected non-pecuniary returns to criminal/gang careers
X is a set of pre-information experiment control variables taken from survey and administrative data, selected using the double lasso method on primary outcomes
S is a set of school fixed effects
e is an error term (not clustered)

When Y is a measure of non-pecuniary benefits, we expect a1 to be negative. We also expect the effects to be larger for youth with priors that non-pecuniary benefits are high, and so we are also interested in a3.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization built into tablet-based survey instrument
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Approximately 100 schools (though these are not clusters, given the individual randomization)
Observations
We expect an experimental sample size of roughly 3,000-4,000 pupils per information experiment, assuming we are successfully able to recruit roughly 10,000 pupils for the surveys. For Experiment 1, we extended this to nearly 6,000 pupils, because the follow-up survey and behavioral measures were introduced late (due to development time). With a follow-up survey response rate of approximately 40%, this allows us to target roughly 1400 to 1600 completed follow up surveys and behavioral engagements.
Arms
Pupils are assigned to the information treatment with a 0.5 probability, and so each experimental sample should include 1,500-2,000 control and treated subjects each. When we also use different means to deliver the information (e.g., statistics vs stories), we randomize within the treatment group with a probability of 0.5 of having one or the other.
Primary outcomes
Our primary survey-based outcome is an indicator variable for high self-reported interest in gang careers. For Experiment 1, we also pre-specified a primary behavioral outcome--the take-up rate of offers of information on higher education and other educational resources. After concluding Experiment 1, it appeared that the information treatment was not persistent enough to change behavior some days to a week after treatment. Prior to launching Experiment 2, we therefore respecified it as a secondary outcome.
Secondary outcomes
Our main secondary analysis is the "first-stage" effect of the information treatment on posterior beliefs. For Experiment 1, this is a measure of their beliefs about the returns to higher education. We expect to look at the mean error, but also the perceived differential between higher education and low-education career earnings. For Experiment 2, this is an index of perceived status and enjoyment (non-pecuniary benefits) of gang entry. Another secondary outcome is a behavioral outcome --- take-up of a WhatsApp-based message to survey respondents, offering them the opportunity to follow a web link to receive information about educational resources and guidance for higher education. Respondents will have individualized links that will enable us to assess whether they click on the website at all. For the behavioral outcome, we also expect to examine levels of engagement with the information offered, including time spent on the web page. (Note that this was specified as a primary outcome in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2, for reasons discussed above.) We also measure both gang interest and posterior beliefs about income in the follow-up survey some days after the in-person survey. This follow-up measure (and the effect of time on responses) is a secondary analysis (as noted above). The difference in effectiveness between stories and statistics in Experiment 1 will be a secondary analysis as well, focusing both on posterior beliefs and also gang behavior.
Partners
Name: Secretariat of Education, Medellin, Colombia Partner_type: government Url: https://www.medellin.edu.co/

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Keywords