Endogenous AI-tocracy: An Experimental Investigation
How to cite
XUE, Lian; Wei, Lijia; Bai, Lu. 2023. "Endogenous AI-tocracy: An Experimental Investigation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011472. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11472-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
“AI-tocracy” describes a potential governance model where individual behavior is influenced and regulated by advancements in Artificial Intelligence. This study explores the nature of AI-tocracy through a series of controlled laboratory experiments. We investigate how AI-generated social scores, when coupled with punitive measures, impact individual cooperation within group settings. Furthermore, this research examines the decision-making processes of individuals when faced with the choice to adopt AI-control mechanisms. Additionally, the research aims to explore the welfare implications and potential future trajectories of AI-tocracy in various economic and social contexts.
Intervention
We conducted two experiments:
Experiment 1 compares group cooperation when a social-score system (AI-score system) is present vs. absent.
Experiment 2 examines individual preferences for incorporating the AI-score system into their group decision-making environment.
In Experiment 1, the Control Treatment (PGG) involves participants playing a standard public goods game for 20 rounds. Two participants receive an endowment of 40 tokens, while the other two receive 20 tokens. Each participant decides how to allocate their endowment between a private and a public account, with contributions to the public account benefiting all group members.
The Social-Score Treatment adds a social scoring system where participants rate each other based on their contributions. The average score for each participant is displayed as a public ranking after each round. The Social-Score-Punish Treatment further introduces punitive measures. Participants face deductions from their payoffs if they receive low scores, calculated based on the difference between their score and the maximum attainable score.
The AI-Score Treatment replaces peer evaluations with AI-generated scores, using a machine learning model trained on data from the Social-Score treatment. Scores are publicly displayed to influence group dynamics. In the AI-Score-Punish Treatment, participants face deductions based on these AI-generated scores, similar to the social punishment system.
In Experiment 2, the Endog Treatment introduces an endogenous decision-making stage. Before playing the public goods game, participants vote on whether to adopt an AI-score system in their group, with a random dictator rule deciding the outcome. The AI scores here are non-punitive, serving only as information. In contrast, the Endog-Punish Treatment includes punitive measures tied to AI-generated scores. Participants vote to decide on implementing the AI control, and if adopted, face deductions based on their scores. This setup explores the impact of punitive AI systems on cooperation and individual preferences.
Experimental design
Experiment 1 investigates the impact of social and AI-generated scoring systems on cooperative behavior in a public goods game. Participants are randomly assigned to one of five treatments: (1) Control (standard public goods game), (2) Social-Score (peer evaluations), (3) Social-Score-Punish (peer evaluations with punitive measures), (4) AI-Score (AI-generated scores without punishment), and (5) AI-Score-Punish (AI-generated scores with punishment). Each treatment involves 20 rounds, with two participants starting with 40 tokens and two with 20 tokens. Contributions to the public account are recorded, along with scores and deductions where applicable.
Experiment 2 introduces an endogenous decision-making stage. Participants vote on whether to adopt an AI-score system for their group. Two treatments are implemented: (1) Endog (AI-score, non-punitive) and (2) Endog-Punish (AI-score with punitive measures). A random dictator rule determines the group's final decision. The main outcomes include contributions to the public good, AI adoption rates, and the impact of punitive versus non-punitive AI scoring on cooperation. Each session includes 20 rounds, with re-voting at the halfway point to observe preference changes over time.
Design details
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