The impact of competition for social status in a game with strategic complementarities and network formation

How to cite

Jia, Mofei; Horvath, Gergely. 2023. "The impact of competition for social status in a game with strategic complementarities and network formation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011399. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11399-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Mofei Jia* , Gergely Horvath

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011399
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11399-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-03-15 – 2023-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11399

Abstract

In the experiment, we study how competition for social status affects individual’s effort level and linking decisions within a social network. We assume homogeneous agents with general linear-quadratic payoff functions where their effort levels exhibit strategic complementarity and positive externality. With costly effort and linking decisions, we introduce two settings on status competition, i.e., monetary status benefits and information on relative position within the group in terms of payoffs, to see whether status competition can increase collaborative effort provision, therefore enhance efficiency.

Intervention

Our experiment employs a 2*2 between-subjects design by manipulating the settings of status competition. The two settings considered here are: 1. Individuals receive monetary status benefits when receiving links from others (van Leeuwen et al., 2020); 2. Individuals are provided information on relative position within the group in terms of payoffs (Charness et al., 2014). Accordingly, we test the impact of each setting of status competition on effort provision and efficiency compared with the baseline, and then also investigate the impact of the interaction term of these two settings. In the experiment, we keep the group size N=5 and fix the parameters used in the general linear-quadratic payoff function.

Experimental design

In the experiment, individuals interact with each other within a group of 5 persons. The experiment lasts for 40 rounds and partner matching is used to keep group members unchanged throughout the whole experiment.

In each round, each individual needs to choose an effort level and initiate links to some or all of the other 4 group members to construct their network neighbors. We assume links are formed unilaterally and costly. Moreover, individuals have a linear-quadratic utility function (Hiller, 2017). The payoff function is shown below:

Pi_i=a*x_i-b/2*x_i^2+lambda*x_i \sum(x_j)-k*n^out_i

where a, b and lambda are parameters, k is the cost of initiating a link, x_i is the effort choice of i, n^out_i is the number of links initiated by i and the summation represents the total effort choices over the neighbors of i. Accordingly, individual’s payoff is positively affected by total effort chosen by his/her network neighbors.

At the end of each round, participants receive feedback on their choices, payoffs, and network formed in the group, as well as the effort levels of other group members. For a typical treatment, additional information on status is provided in the feedback as well. The final earning of the experiment for each individual is the sum of his/her payoffs over all the 40 rounds.

In the treatments, we introduce two types of status competition: 1. individuals receive monetary status benefits when receiving links from other group members, i.e., adding an additional item (m*n^in_i) on the right-hand side of individual’s payoff function Pi_i, denoted by Treatment S(tatus); 2. individuals are provided information on relative position within the group in terms of payoffs in the feedback at the end of each round, denoted by Treatment R(anking). Treatment I(teraction) investigates the combined impact of the interaction and the treatment with no status manipulation is denoted by Baseline.

We study the impact of different ways of status competition on individual’s effort and linking choices, payoffs, efficiency, and network structure formed. Moreover, we are going to investigate the combined effect of these two settings of status competition.

In the experiment, we set a=10, b=4, lambda=0.4, k=3.9, and m=6. At the end of the experiment, participants fill out a short questionnaire about their demographics, cognitive reflection test, and risk-preferences.

The experiment is conducted in the Experimental Economics Lab at International Business School Suzhou, Xi’an jiaotong-Liverpool University with participants recruited on the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) using the o-Tree software.

References
Charness, G., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2014). The dark side of competition for status. Management Science, 60(1), 38-55.
Hiller, T. (2017). Peer effects in endogenous networks. Games and Economic Behavior, 105, 349-367.
van Leeuwen, B., Offerman, T., & Schram, A. (2020). Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(2), 666-707.

Design details

Randomization method
By oTree program within each session.
Randomization unit
Group level
Clusters
Number of groups per treatment: Baseline: 10 Treatment S(tatus): 10 Treatment R(anking): 10 Treatment I(nteraction):10
Observations
Number of participants per group: 5 people Participants in total: 5*10*4 = 200
Arms
10 groups per treatment
Primary outcomes
Effort levels chosen by individuals, Number of links formed by individuals, Payoffs of individuals.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords