The Impacts of Worker Monitoring
How to cite
Kala, Namrata; Lyons, Elizabeth. 2023. "The Impacts of Worker Monitoring." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011365. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11365-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Remote hiring and work have the potential to expand the set of labor market opportunities across geographies. We will use an online platform to study how worker input monitoring affects worker productivity and morale, and how this relationship varies by the reasons cited for monitoring.
Intervention
Remote hiring and work have the potential to expand the set of labor market opportunities across geographies, and disproportionately benefit workers traditionally underemployed in their local labor markets (such as those in remote areas, or those preferring flexible work arrangements). However, which practices optimize worker productivity and well-being in remote work is less studied. In this paper, we focus on one management practice frequently and increasingly employed by remote work employers; digital monitoring of workers. Software that monitors digital activities can help managers better identify shirking and thus may make riskier hiring more feasible, but may also reduce worker motivation and well-being. Our study will test the impacts of digital monitoring on worker performance and job satisfaction among remote workers on an online platform.
Experimental design
We will hire workers in an online labor market for a data entry job. All workers will work for 2 hours in the same conditions, which will be in the "Team Room", which is an online room where their presence is monitored, and screenshot and activity summary is sent every 10 minutes that a freelancer tracks time. This is what we call "surveilled conditions" or “monitored conditions”, which in particular focus on input monitoring such as screenshots.
After two hours, we will randomly assign workers to one the following arms:
a) A random subset of high (above) median productivity workers (N=130), as measured by the number of accurate cells of data entered, will be told that they can work the other 6 hours out of the monitored conditions because they have performed well so far. We call this the "justified lack of monitoring" arm, since workers get the ability to work unmonitored as a reward for higher productivity.
b) A random subset of high (above) median productivity workers (N=130) will be informed about their productivity, and have the requirement to work in the monitored conditions digitally removed,. We call this the "lack of monitoring" arm, since workers get the ability to work unmonitored but without directly linking it to their productivity.
c) A random subset of high (above) median productivity workers (N=130) will be informed about their productivity, but there will be no change in their working condition.
d) A random subset of low (below median) productivity workers (N=130) will be told that they will work the other 6 hours under monitored conditions because they have made a high number of errors in the data entry. We call this the "justified monitoring" arm.
e) A random subset of low (below median) productivity workers (N=130) will be informed about their productivity, but there will be no change in their working condition. We call this the "monitoring" arm.
f) A random subset of low (below median) productivity workers (N=130) will be informed about their productivity, and have the requirement to work in the monitored conditions digitally removed. We call this the "lack of monitoring" arm.
Design details
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