Delegation in the household : Theory and Experimental Evidence
How to cite
Boltz, Marie; Guirkinger, Catherine; Ziparo, Roberta; Jolivet, Anna; Baland, Jean-Marie. 2023. "Delegation in the household : Theory and Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011353. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11353-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Bargaining power within the couple is often proxied in surveys by measures of who has a say in the decision -- with the idea that the more a couple discusses about choices to make, the more balanced is the bargaining power within the couple. However, arguing and discussing over a choice could also reflect non-aligned preferences among partners: with perfectly aligned preferences, who decides is not so important and delegation of the decision power becomes an efficient outcome.
We explore this pattern in a theoretical framework looking at the equilibrium decision structure in the household, analyzing how the degree of preference alignment and the differences in the opportunity costs of time determine when delegation or negociation is preferable. We consider a non-cooperative framework for intra-household decisions drawing from models of delegation of authority in firms developed by Dessein (2002) and Aghion and Tirole (1997). We test the predictions of the model in an online experiment conducted among couples.
Intervention
We will conduct an online experiment with couples living in the region of Namur. Participants will be contacted by mails. If they are interested to take part in the survey and if they satisfy our eligibility criteria -- being above 18, living in couple for more than 2 years --, both partners could register into the survey platform and start to answer the survey. In the experiment, we elicit the willingness to pay for different goods for both partners. We will randomly vary across games and partners the cost to acquire information about the goods. We will thus test whether, given a certain cost and the degree of expected preference (non) alignment for the good within the couple, the individual will want to pay to acquire information about the good and/or choose to delegate rather to participate in the decision.
We will further correlate these decisions with survey measures such as task sharing within the household, and decisions in vignette situations from the post-experiment questionnaire.
Experimental design
Participants will be contacted by mails. If they are interested to take part in the survey and if they satisfy our eligibility criteria -- being above 18, living in couple for more than 2 years --, both partners could register into the survey platform and start to answer the survey. Partners will have to connect at the same time.
(1) In the experiment we first elicit the willingness to pay for different goods for both partners.
(2) We will randomly partition the set of goods between partners - so that they make the following decisions on different goods to avoid incentives to communicate.
We will vary across games and partners the cost to acquire information about the goods.
We will thus test whether, given a certain cost and the degree of expected preference (non) alignment for the good within the couple, the individual will want to pay to acquire information about the good and/or choose to delegate rather to participate in the decision.
Design details
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