Delegation in the household : Theory and Experimental Evidence

How to cite

Boltz, Marie; Guirkinger, Catherine; Ziparo, Roberta; Jolivet, Anna; Baland, Jean-Marie. 2023. "Delegation in the household : Theory and Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011353. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11353-1.0

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Marie Boltz* , Catherine Guirkinger , Roberta Ziparo , Anna Jolivet , Jean-Marie Baland

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011353
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11353-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-05-10 – 2024-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D13, O12
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11353

Abstract

Bargaining power within the couple is often proxied in surveys by measures of who has a say in the decision -- with the idea that the more a couple discusses about choices to make, the more balanced is the bargaining power within the couple. However, arguing and discussing over a choice could also reflect non-aligned preferences among partners: with perfectly aligned preferences, who decides is not so important and delegation of the decision power becomes an efficient outcome.

We explore this pattern in a theoretical framework looking at the equilibrium decision structure in the household, analyzing how the degree of preference alignment and the differences in the opportunity costs of time determine when delegation or negociation is preferable. We consider a non-cooperative framework for intra-household decisions drawing from models of delegation of authority in firms developed by Dessein (2002) and Aghion and Tirole (1997). We test the predictions of the model in an online experiment conducted among couples.

Intervention

We will conduct an online experiment with couples living in the region of Namur. Participants will be contacted by mails. If they are interested to take part in the survey and if they satisfy our eligibility criteria -- being above 18, living in couple for more than 2 years --, both partners could register into the survey platform and start to answer the survey. In the experiment, we elicit the willingness to pay for different goods for both partners. We will randomly vary across games and partners the cost to acquire information about the goods. We will thus test whether, given a certain cost and the degree of expected preference (non) alignment for the good within the couple, the individual will want to pay to acquire information about the good and/or choose to delegate rather to participate in the decision.
We will further correlate these decisions with survey measures such as task sharing within the household, and decisions in vignette situations from the post-experiment questionnaire.

Experimental design

Participants will be contacted by mails. If they are interested to take part in the survey and if they satisfy our eligibility criteria -- being above 18, living in couple for more than 2 years --, both partners could register into the survey platform and start to answer the survey. Partners will have to connect at the same time.

(1) In the experiment we first elicit the willingness to pay for different goods for both partners.

(2) We will randomly partition the set of goods between partners - so that they make the following decisions on different goods to avoid incentives to communicate.
We will vary across games and partners the cost to acquire information about the goods.
We will thus test whether, given a certain cost and the degree of expected preference (non) alignment for the good within the couple, the individual will want to pay to acquire information about the good and/or choose to delegate rather to participate in the decision.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Within couple, individual randomization - multiple games. We observe both partners.
Clusters
0
Observations
TBD - it depends on the take up after sending the email invitations.
Arms
Within individual treatment arms.
Primary outcomes
Our key outcomes will be the decisions to pay to acquire more information within the experiment or not and the decision to delegate or to participate in the decision across games. We will also analyze the degree of preference (non) alignment.
Secondary outcomes
We will further exploit questions from the survey about decision making within the couples (like vignettes or survey questions about task sharing within the households).

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords