Fostering human capital development through school feeding and teacher incentives

How to cite

Lerva, Benedetta; Kelley, Erin; Heirman, Jonas; Kondylis, Florence; Christian, Paul; Lane, Gregory; Lombardini, Simone; Zwager, Astrid. 2023. "Fostering human capital development through school feeding and teacher incentives." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011324. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11324-1.0

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Benedetta Lerva* , Erin Kelley , Jonas Heirman , Florence Kondylis , Paul Christian , Gregory Lane , Simone Lombardini , Astrid Zwager

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011324
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11324-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2022-08-01 – 2023-12-29
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91, I15, I25, O12, O15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11324

Abstract

School attendance and learning in lower-income countries are hampered by both demand and supply constraints. On the demand side, health and nutrition may affect attendance, potentially compounded by competing demands on a child’s time. On the supply side, low levels of teacher attendance may affect schooling decisions and learning. We cross-randomize teacher incentives with the randomized expansion of the national school feeding program to study the impacts of relaxing demand and supply constraints individually and jointly. We also exploit seasonal variation to further shed light on demand-side mechanisms and provide novel evidence on the role of school feeding programs as a social safety net for protecting children against shocks and stressors.

Intervention

School feeding intervention - Schools assigned to the school feeding program receive resources from the WFP to provide meals to students five days a week. Each school food management committee is in charge of selecting the suppliers and preparing the daily meal for the students. The target is to provide children a meal with a daily average of 580 Kcal. The meals include five typical Gambian dishes. Following the WFP school procurement manual, the schools purchase food items from local communities. The WFP monitors the schools’ procurement practices to ensure they adhere to the manual. The first meals were provided to students in January 2022.
Teacher Incentives intervention - The teacher incentive program provides grade 3 teachers in selected schools with a bonus to perform a daily data collection task that requires them to be present at the school. Teachers are asked to keep daily records of which kids received a school meal (in schools receiving school feeding) or brought/bought breakfast (in schools that do not receive school feeding). A meal ledger was prepared for teachers to record this information in a consistent manner. Teachers assigned to receive the incentive are provided a monthly bonus equal to a maximum of 500 Dalasi, roughly 10 percent of their monthly salary, for filling the meal ledger; the payment is proportional to the number of days the ledger is filled conditional on having filled a minimum number of days.

Experimental design

We leverage the expansion of school meal coverage supported by the World Food Programme’s (WFP) in certain regions. Due to financial constraints, the program expansion was limited to 46 additional schools. We randomly assign 92 schools to a treatment or control group: in school feeding treatment schools, all students receive a warm nutritious lunch; students in control schools do not.
Additionally, we investigate supply-side constraints to school attendance and learning by cross-randomizing a teacher incentives arm designed to increase teacher attendance. We ask teachers to complete a daily meal ledger for the classroom and in return, offer a payment equivalent to 10% of their salary. The daily meal ledger indicates whether each student received a meal that day. To fill the ledger, teachers must be present on school, and multiple checks are put in place to ensure that the incentives are conditional on teacher attendance. Cross-randomizing this incentive arm with the school feeding arm allows us to investigate potential complementarity between demand (school-feeding) and supply (teacher attendance) side interventions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Primary Schools (Clusters)
Clusters
92 schools
Observations
2175 children
Arms
School feeding and teacher incentives: 23 schools, 608 students, 31 teachers School feeding no teacher incentives: 23 schools, 539 students, 26 teachers No school feeding and teacher incentives: 23 schools, 470 students, 30 teachers No school feeding and no teacher incentives: 23 schools, 558 students, 27 teachers
Primary outcomes
First Stage Outcomes: child dietary diversity, child food insecurity experience scale, teacher attendance. Second Stage Outcomes: child mental health/psychological wellbeing (life satisfaction, stress, depression, agency), child physical health (health status, nutritional status), child school attendance, child school progression (dropout, repetition, grade progression), learning (reading skills, numeracy and mathematics skills), child cognitive ability (attention span, verbal working memory, fluid intelligence).

Cited by

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Keywords