At least you´ve tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard

How to cite

Wübbelmann, Cheyenne; Mertins, Vanessa; Hiller, Maximilian; Kwasniok, Devin. 2023. "At least you´ve tried – The value of safety nets in betting against the inner bastard." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011319. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11319-1.0

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Cheyenne Wübbelmann* , Vanessa Mertins , Maximilian Hiller , Devin Kwasniok

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011319
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11319-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-04-24 – 2023-05-14
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93, D91, I12
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11319

Abstract

Several studies show a positive effect of deposit contracts on increasing physical activity. To be effective, the commitment device must be accepted by participants. Most studies show that take-up rates in a loss-framed design are very low. Loss aversion explains both the significant effects of deposit contracts and low take-up rates. Therefore, we designed a RCT in which safety nets make the loss-framed incentive more acceptable for participants without reducing the effects of loss aversion on behavior change.

We have developed a between-subject randomized controlled trial to test the effects of safety nets on goal achievement, defined as steps per day. Approximately 300 participants between the ages of 18 and 85 will be randomly assigned to one of four experimental treatments or the control treatment. Each participant will set his own goal (e.g., 9,000 steps per day) to achieve during the intervention period of 20 days. Furthermore, we focus on repeated bets, so that each participant can decide everyday if he wants to accept the challenge the next day. We want to find out how the incentives are optimally designed and whether the prospect of a safety net as well as repeated bets lead first to higher take-up rates and second to a higher goal achievement.

We run the experiment within an ongoing 365-day long study with subjects who are all seeking to improve their physical activity. All participants have been positively health screened, are using a smartphone app (ActiVAtE Behavior) to transmit their steps (main performance measure) in a timely manner and have already provided extensive individual data at the time of the intervention. While all participants indicated in the application questionnaire that they were eager to walk more steps per day, there is a large variation in ex-ante daily steps submitted via a smartphone app over the past 9 months. Since the daily goal is set by the participants themselves, there is also a corresponding variation in individual goals. Furthermore, we have a very rich dataset on each individual, including not only activity data before, during, and after the intervention, but also a wide variety of preferences (measured via economic laboratory experiments) as well as sociodemographic data and individual attitudes and self-reported behavior (measured via questionnaires).

Intervention

T0: Control
T1: Safety net 0 (Standard reward; 0% of the origin step goal)
T2: Safety net 1 (50% of the origin step goal)
T3: Safety net 2 (50% and 75% of the origin step goal)
T4: Safety net 3 (Standard deposit contract; 100% of the origin step goal)

In T0, no incentive is present.
In T1 we offer participants a standard reward: Every day a participant opted-in and reaches his individual step goal, he will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
The same reward is offered to participants in the T2 treatment. Furthermore, we offer participants in T2 a deposit contract with a safety net. Every time participants in T2 opted-in and fail to meet 50% of their individual step goal, they lose 0.75€. With the moment they reach at least 50% of their step goal the safety net will be active, and they will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
Participants in T3 lose 0.75€ if they have opted-in and fail to reach 50% of their step goal. If participants in T4 reach 50% their step goal, again a safety net is active, and they lose 0.50€s if they have opted-in and fail to reach 75% of their step goal. With reaching at least 75% of their step goal, the second safety net will be active, and participants will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Again, only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
In T4 we offer participants a standard incentivized deposit contract: Every day participants opted-in and fail to reach their individual step goal they lose 0.75€. When participants in T4 achieve their step goal, the safety net will be active and they will immediately receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.

Experimental design

We conduct a randomized controlled trial to test the effects of safety nets in combination with loss and gain framed monetary incentives on physical activity and individual goal achievement. Physical activity therefor is defined as the number of steps per day and is measured via a smartphone app. The goals are defined by the participants themselves with the indication to set an ambitious goal. Incentive phase will last 20 days. To participate in the incentives, participants in all treatments have to opt-in every day of the 20-day duration. Participants are randomized to one of the following five treatment groups:

T0: ControlT0: Control
T1: Safety net 0 (Standard reward; 0% of the origin step goal)
T2: Safety net 1 (50% of the origin step goal)
T3: Safety net 2 (50% and 75% of the origin step goal)
T4: Safety net 3 (Standard deposit contract; 100% of the origin step goal)

In T0, no incentive is present.
In T1 we offer participants a standard reward: Every day a participant opted-in and reaches his individual step goal, he will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
The same reward is offered to participants in the T2 treatment. Furthermore, we offer participants in T2 a deposit contract with a safety net. Every time participants in T2 opted-in and fail to meet 50% of their individual step goal, they lose 0.75€. With the moment they reach at least 50% of their step goal the safety net will be active, and they will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
Participants in T3 lose 0.75€ if they have opted-in and fail to reach 50% of their step goal. If participants in T4 reach 50% their step goal, again a safety net is active, and they lose 0.50€ if they have opted-in and fail to reach 75% of their step goal. With reaching at least 75% of their step goal, the second safety net will be active, and participants will neither receive a loss nor a gain. Again, only if they reach 100% of their step goal, they will receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.
In T4 we offer participants a standard incentivized deposit contract: Every day participants opted-in and fail to reach their individual step goal they lose 0.75€. When participants in T4 achieve their step goal, the safety net will be active, and they will immediately receive a fixed bonus of 0.25€.

Prior to intervention phase, participants will receive a survey, where they can claim their individual step goal for the 20-day intervention phase. After randomization, each participant will be contacted via WhatsApp and introduced to the treatment.

Design details

Randomization method
Random draw by computer
Randomization unit
Randomization will be at the individual level
Clusters
350
Observations
350
Arms
70
Primary outcomes
goal achievement (number of successful days), steps per day, degree of target achievement, repeated take-up rate
Secondary outcomes
average costs per treatment, individual costs per goal

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Keywords