Social preferences and responsiveness to bribery - a survey experiment
How to cite
Parvanova, Iva; Lagarde, Mylene. 2023. "Social preferences and responsiveness to bribery - a survey experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011315. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11315-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Bribery as a form of petty corruption is a widespread phenomenon contributing to overburdened provision of public services across low- and middle-income countries. The adverse effects on the quality, equity and trust within these systems are widely acknowledged. There are numerous challenges associated with researching corruption of any type due to its illicit nature. Moreover, observing the quality, timeliness or provider effort of most public services (such as healthcare or education) adds another layer of complexity in determining the real effect of bribery on the delivery of these services. Within this study I propose a novel experimental design which allows me to measure the extent to which bribery is reciprocated. Furthermore, by incorporating varying service provider and recipient characteristics, I will be able to assess the effects on social preferences on this degree of responsiveness. By proposing a cross-cultural experimental set-up, recruiting students from Bulgaria and the UK, I will utilize the underlying discrepancies in bribery prevalence to elicit the interactions between corruption norms and social preferences.
Intervention
The intervention aims to assess the effect of social preferences and norms on the likelihood of reciprocating bribery. Through a survey experiment, individuals are randomly assigned to receive alternative messages linked to in- and out-group inequity as well as the possibility of bribe rejection. We will test how these prompts triggering various social and fairness preferences affect the generosity of participants when distributing a scarce resource between two hypothetical individuals (the briber and non-briber).
Experimental design
We will randomly present participants with information prompts linked to inequality and bribery.
Individuals will randomly be assigned to one of 5 groups:
1) control
2) bribery
3) bribery + in-group inequity
4) bribery + out-group inequity
5) bribery + rejection
Design details
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