Fairness and Excuse Seeking-Behavior

How to cite

Ahumada, Beatriz. 2023. "Fairness and Excuse Seeking-Behavior." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011312. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11312-1.0

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Beatriz Ahumada*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011312
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11312-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-04-21 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11312

Abstract

Understanding preferences for distribution and inequality acceptance in environments with uncertainty about the cause of inequality is key to designing redistributive policies. In this project, I will use a laboratory experiment to study how uncertainty about the role luck and effort play in determining income affects redistribution, and how people use this uncertainty to excuse behavior not aligned with their fairness views in favor of self-interest.

Experimental design

Participants perform a task and the money they earn depends on effort and luck. Then they are paired and distribute the sum of earnings between themselves. Two treatments, one with full information, and another one where participants do not know the role luck and effort had in determining their earnings.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization of piece rate is done via the computer, in oTree. Randomization between treatments will be based on which sessions participants sign up for. Where the first 3 sessions (already run) were of the full information treatment.
Randomization unit
The randomization of the piece rate is done by individual. The randomization of treatment is done at session level.
Clusters
No Clusters
Observations
I expect to have 200 participants.
Arms
I plan to have 80 participants in the full information treatment and 120 participants in the partial information treatment.
Primary outcomes
I collect the following primary outcomes: - Distribution to himself and to partner - Beliefs about the probability of getting high and low piece rate for self and partner. - Implemented inequality

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords