The Effect of Voting on Political Preferences
How to cite
Wang, Siyu. 2023. "The Effect of Voting on Political Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011309. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11309-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how voting and electoral outcomes impact voters' evaluations of politicians. A few hypotheses are tested. First, chosen preference theory predicts that the act of voting could lead to a more favorable opinion of the supported candidate in the future in order to resolve internal dissonance. Second, we apply motivated belief in the context of voting. Winning an election is interpreted by voters as evidence that confirms the correctness of their vote. However, losing an election is not calculated the same way. Finally, stronger echo chambers may form among friends and religious groups after their supported candidate wins.
Intervention
Subjects are asked to do a real-effort task at the beginning of the experiment. Afterwards, every three subjects are grouped together and share the income they have earned from the task. There are two income sharing plans. One plan is to share income equally among three subjects in a group. While the other plan rewards the two higher performers 40% and the low performer 20% of the total income. In the baseline, subjects rate two income redistribution plans before voting for them. In other treatments, we ask subjects to vote for one of two plans. In the Treatment 1, subjects are asked to rate each plan before and after voting, then we reveal the vote counts and provide an opportunity for every 2 subjects to discuss the outcome. In Treatment 2, subjects have the same task except the voting result is provided before the second rating. In Treatment 3 (optional), both the voting outcome revelation and discussion are conducted before the second favoritism rating.
Experimental design
Subjects are asked to do a real-effort task at the beginning of the experiment. Afterwards, every three subjects are grouped together and share the income they have earned from the task. There are two income sharing plans. One plan is to share income equally among three subjects in a group. While the other plan rewards the two higher performers 40% and the low performer 20% of the total income. In the baseline, subjects rate two income redistribution plans before voting for them. In other treatments, we ask subjects to vote for one of two plans. In the Treatment 1, subjects are asked to rate each plan before and after voting, then we reveal the vote counts and provide an opportunity for every 2 subjects to discuss the outcome. In Treatment 2, subjects have the same task except the voting result is provided before the second rating. In Treatment 3 (optional), both the voting outcome revelation and discussion are conducted before the second favoritism rating.
Design details
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