Lying in Reciprocal Appraisals
How to cite
Li, Lunzheng; Louis, Philippos; Maniadis, Zacharias; Xefteris, Dimitrios. 2023. "Lying in Reciprocal Appraisals." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011281. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11281-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In various economic situations, people assess others and are often willing to lie to benefit other individuals. This could be due to pure altruism or reciprocity, that is to say, people lie for others hoping the others will pay them back in the future. This can be problematic in settings such as science, where peer review systems are considered the cornerstone of research assessment. While peer review is nominally anonymous, in practice anonymity is very hard to preserve, especially in relatively small domains. We examine the existence and magnitude of such a “reciprocal lying” effect.
Intervention
There are two interventions, hypothesized to lead to varying levels of dishonesty. The main intervention (captured by the formal model of reciprocity) concerns the timing of play (simultaneous or reciprocal). The secondary intervention concerns the 'grouping', namely whether participants are placed together in groups that assess each other or not.
Experimental design
The study is based on Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi's (2013) die-rolling paradigm. Participants are instructed to roll a dice and report the result, which determines the payments of other participants. There will be four experimental conditions, all of which shall be one-shot. The experiments will be conducted online using a widely used platform.
Design details
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