Outcome Bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting 2
How to cite
Loewenfeld, Moritz. 2023. "Outcome Bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting 2." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011213. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11213-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
I consider a setting of delegated risk taking. Agents choose between a first-order stochastically
dominant and a dominated lottery. Principals observe choices and outcomes of both lotteries and
then decide whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. The goal of this experiment is to
study whether outcome bias (OB), that is a tendency to condition bonus payments on outcomes,
can shape the incentives faced by agents and thereby their choices. In particular, I seek to address
the following research questions. 1) Can outcome bias in bonus decisions eliminate incentives to
optimal actions? 2) Do agents anticipate the OB of principals correctly and 3) do they adjust their
choices accordingly, i.e. can outcome bias induce more choices of sub-optimal actions, and thus
decrease welfare?
Intervention
I run a lab experiment at the Toulouse School of Economics. For details on the design, see the document "design_pap.pdf".
Experimental design
Agents make a number of decisions between two lotteries on behalf of the principals. Principals decide on bonus payments. Participants are randomly and permanently assigned to the role of either principal or agent.
For details, see the document "design_pap.pdf".
Design details
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